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From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: Eliza (was Re: Are there non-humans lurking on Internet/Usenet?)
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References: <3hc1uf$53l@mp.cs.niu.edu> <jqbD3r784.KE4@netcom.com> <3he94f$jgp@mp.cs.niu.edu> <D3srEx.C88@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 1995 06:14:28 GMT
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In article <D3srEx.C88@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>In article <3he94f$jgp@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>In <jqbD3r784.KE4@netcom.com> jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter) writes:
>>
>>>In article <3hc1uf$53l@mp.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <rickert@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>>>In <jqbD3pB6w.94K@netcom.com> jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter) writes:
>>
>>>>>Given this definition of understanding from Random House 2nd ed.:
>>>>>
>>>>>	knowledge of or familiarity with a particular thing; skill in dealing
>>>>>	with or handling something
>>>>
>>>>>I would say that Eliza displays *some* understanding.  Perhaps if
>>>>>you or Jeff could offer your definitions of the word, any disagreement
>>>>>over the issue could be resolved.
>>
>>>>This
>>>>one is somewhat question begging, given that "knowledge" and
>>>>"familiarity" are not easy to define either.  Skill is a measure of
>>>>understanding, although short of a definition.  I suppose that
>>>>understanding has two meanings.  The skill/knowledge/familiarity is
>>>>more-or-less what we mean when we ascribe understanding to someone.
>>
>>>If one is non-randomly successful at something, it is reasonable to say
>>>that one is skilled.  Why is Eliza not skilled at eliciting personal
>>>commentary (from the sorts of people that Weizenbaum has success with)?
>>>Can you give an answer that doesn't include anthropomorphic bias?
>>
>>You have well described why "understanding" is so slippery. 
>
>This discussion shows well one of the reasons it can be difficult to
>convince someone that Eliza has no understanding: anything someone
>says on the subject can be treated as ill-defined, thus changing
>the discussion from one about whether Eliza understands to a fruitless
>dispute about what various words mean.  I have never seen any ai.phil
>discussion resolved in that way.

Why are you so intent on convincing people that Eliza has no understanding
when you demonstrably do not yet understand what understanding is?  You seem
as perturbed by the idea that anyone might harbor a thought that Eliza might
understand, as Searle seems perturbed by the idea that anyone might harbor
a thought that some computer, by virtue of executing an algorithm, might
understand.  Why are you guys so dang *sure* of yourselves when you cannot
rigorously define the terms, or even demonstrate that you have thought deeply
about them?  This idea that you really *should* be able to convince people
of these things if only they would do this or avoid doing that seems extremely
arrogant to me.

>Initially, one might think that the question of what "understand" means
>could just as well be used against claims that Eliza does have some
>understanding as against claims that Eliza has none, but that turns
>out not to be the case.

It is hardly surprising given that "some" and "none" have such different
semantics.  It is easy to provide definitions of "understand" that let
*some* understanding leak in.  It is quite a bit harder to provide definitions
of "understand" that shut out *all* understanding.  If you want such a
definition, you are going to have to do the hard work.  I'm waiting to
see you do that sort of hard work.  Simply implying that Eliza doesn't
have any understanding without struggling to produce models that allow us
to conclude that is cheating.

>It's fairly easy to produce definitions
>of "understanding" that refer only to externally observable behavior
>and then to argue that Eliza has enough of the right sorts of
>behavior to count as having some understanding.  And even without such
>a definition it's possible to insist that all acceptable definitions
>must provide publically observable criteria.
>
>This makes things difficult for anyone who thinks understanding is
>not just a matter of publically observable criteria or who thinks
>that we don't yet know what the right criteria are.

You are right; it is difficult.  Too difficult for you?

>If they provide
>any definition that's of the demanded sort, it will have to be one
>they don't actually think is right and they will already have
>surrendered most of the ground that's in dispute.  If they provide
>any other kind of definition, it can be attacked as vacuous.
>And if they refuse to play the definition game, they can be attacked
>in even stronger terms.

People who play the "I don't believe you don't know what I mean" game
are intellectual charlatans who should indeed be attacked in strong terms.

>So these guys can be held off forever.  
>All useful discussion stops right there, and no further progress
>can be made.

So you are saying are having trouble winning an argument.  Y'know,
life is tough.  I am still waiting for a cogent argument of *any* sort
that shows that Eliza has no understanding.  You can use any sort of
definition you want, or even eschew definitions altogether.  But you can't
just point at "understanding" and point at Eliza and imply that we ought
to know better that Eliza doesn't understand.  Well, you can, but that is
not what I mean by "cogent".

>The same thing can be done with any other word we might try in
>place of "understanding".  "Consciousness", "intelligence",
>and so forth all suffer the same fate.

Yes.  Maybe that either indicates that there is a problem with your position,
or that you have not yet found the appropriate exposition that supports your
position.  You need an *argument*, some grounds for showing that you are
right, beyond mere posturing involving agreeing with people's "reasonable"
claims and talking about what people "ought to know better".
-- 
<J Q B>

