Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and consciousness
Message-ID: <D03qpH.7C9@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <CzsIwC.DFv@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <Czu580.2Fv@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <D01oB1.JG8@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 1994 22:34:29 GMT
Lines: 126

In article <D01oB1.JG8@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>In article <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>In article <Czu580.2Fv@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
>>Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>I don't understand why people have so much difficulty with that
>>>"Platonic" view.  Calling it Platonic seems a bit prejudicial to
>>>me; I prefer "realism" (a common term for it in philosophy).
>>>It's similar to realism about the physical world: e.g. that stars,
>>>etc existed before there was anyone around to observe them.
>>>
>>I think that using the word "realism" is prejudical, because it implies that
>>they are real, which is debatable.
>
>All it implies is that something is the case, not that there are
>any extra entities or substances.
>
But is it the case? Like in our discussion about "gold" - it just is not 
the case that in a distant past people always meant the same thing by "gold"
as they do now.

>> Why is "Platonic" prejudical?
>
>Because it brings in Plato's world of ideal forms, which is not
>any part of realism about mental properties.
>
If you stick to your position about "gold", then you must be referring to 
some "ideal" of gold which has properties about we even now do not know.
BTW, which isotope of gold are you referring to?

>>>Certainly the idea that something might be the case even though
>>>I can't tell doesn't bother me; moreover, there must be many things
>>>of that sort.  E.g. did Napoleon have an egg for breakfast 3 days
>>>after his 7th birthday?  (I'm trying to pick something that won't
>>>be in any records -- substitute a different example if there's one
>>>you prefer.)
>>>
>>If you allow that the above fact is not in any records, then there is no way
>>to establish it and then it does not make sense for me to discuss if this
>>was a case or not. Claiming that it is a "matter of fact" what he had for
>>breakfast on that day even if it cannot be possibly established comes down to
>>misuse of words, very much as argued by Wittgenstein.
>
>Nonehteless, Napoleon did either eat an egg or not for breakfast
>that day (counting not hvaing breakfast on the didn't eat an egg
>for breakfast side).  That's all I mean by saying there's a fact.
>If Wittgenstein's an anti-realist about the past, then I'd say
>he's wrong.
>
The point is that there is no way to know it, i.e. it does not make any 
difference. Discussing it makes as much sense as counting angels on a pin head.
Classifying it as "a matter of fact" is misuse of the term, since it puts it
on par with real "matters of fact", about which we can have evidence.
It obscures the fact that our knowledge of the world comes from interacting
with it and ultimately only this interaction counts.
.......
>>>BTW, your view sounds like verificationist to me.  Perhaps
>>>we can at least determine whether it is verificationist.  
>>>
>>I am not sure of an exact definition of a verificationism. It might be 
>>(hopefully you do not mean it as a term of abuse).
>
>I have in mind (roughly) the view that statements are meaningless
>unless they can in principle be verified.  I don't regard it as a
>term of abuse, but I do regard it as incorrect.
>
Well it loos then that I am espousing verificationism. What in your opinion
gives meaning to statements, which cannot be verified?
.......
>>Because it is more 'economical' - it does not require claiming existance of
>>things which are not necessary.
>
>Why is it more economical?  I'm not sure what you're getting at
>here.
>
'Economica' meaning it uses only minimum of resources. If you have two points
to show you a trend, lacking any other evidence you would run a straight line
though them, since only two parameters can be uniquely determined with two
points, right? Even though you could run an infinity of other lines, with all
sorts of parameters, values of which you would have to take out of thin air,
or use your emotional preferences (biases).

>>>working against, say, physical objects, if we could explain our
>>>experience without bringing them in.  But we still ordinarily allow
>>
>>I do not understand - how can some objects be physical if our experience 
>>does not in some sense interact with them? What is your definition of
>>"physical"?
>
>I didn't say the objects could be physical if our experience 
>does not interact with them.  I said we might (well, "if...")
>be able to explain experience w/o including physical objects
>in the explanation.
>
I am confused. If we can explain experience w/o these "physical objects"
it means that they have no impact on our experiences, doesn't it? Or what
is another possibility? If our experience interacts with them, how can we
explain it w/o them? I am really puzzled what you mean!
......
>I mean that in some cases where Occam's razor would pick A over B
>we nonetheless pick B and regard that as correct.
>
Occam's razer is a criterion of last resort, I've though it was clear to
everyone. We use it to make a choice, when no other criteria are available. 
Please give an example when we choose a more complicated explanation,
over a simpler one, with no evidence favouring the complicated one.
Well, some poeple do it on idelogical grounds, but this is not science.

>>And the point is that if mental states are
>>physical states of a physical brain system. If they are, then there should
>>be an "objective" (independent of the brain having them) way of establishing
>>it. If this cannot be done, then Occam's razor cuts them off - they are not
>>necessary to explain functioning of the brain.
>
>I think I actually agree with that.
>
I am relieved, honestly.

>-- jd

Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
