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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Penrose and Searle (was Re: Roger Penrose's fixed ideas)
Message-ID: <D03pCM.3sy@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
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References: <CzsHMy.B9n@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <CzuAD4.4K6@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <CzzuEu.F48@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <D01LqA.I9q@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 1994 22:05:10 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.skeptic:96711 comp.ai.philosophy:22925 sci.philosophy.meta:15164

In article <D01LqA.I9q@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>In article <CzzuEu.F48@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
.......
>>This particular evidence was picked by Turing, so as to isolate ourselves
>>from human biases. Otherwise, you would be suggesting that classifying
>>someone as 'conscious' depends on what he/she looks like, whetehr he/she
>>has acceptable body laqnguage etc.  This brings out in force a mutlitude of
>>cultural biases (if someone is black, can he/she be really conscious? Or
>>makes totally inappropriate gestures and body sounds? How about severely
>>deformed humans?). 
>
>Have I ever suggested that such criteria be used?  BTW, this is the
>kind of think I have in mind by saying the TT is fiercely defended.
>It looks like you might be trying to tie me to racism and other nasty
>prejudices.  Perhaps that's not your intention, but if it's not I wish
>you'd make that clear.
>
It is of no interest to me what view you hold on the subject of race, etc.
I do not see how such views would be relevant to this discussion which should
be based on generally obseravble facts and not emotions about them.
What I was trying to illustrate is that cultural biases do influence people's
opinions and hence we should attempt to use criteria which have clear 
relevance. "looks" for instance should not be a meaningful factor in our
judgement if someone (or something) is intelligent. This is the spirit in
which Turing suggested his test. See Mark Rosenfelder's exposition 
......
>My usual example of a possibility is two programs that both generate
>TT-passing behavior but differ internally so that e.g. one generates
>consciousness while the other doesn't, or, say, one conducts an
>internal dialogue while the other doesn't.
>
Since we do not know how to judge presence of consciousnes except by giving
a TT, the above is meaningless. This is the same as infamous "zombie 
argument". Each of these programs have to involve internal processes. How
do you propose to judge which is "internal dialog" and which one isn't?
If two modems negotiate a connection, by what criterion do you decide that
this does not constitute an "internal dialogue"? If a program sends a query to 
a printer to find out if the printer is ready, why is this not an internal
dialogue? If processors in a multiprocessor machine exchange messages, what 
grounds do you have to claim that this is not an "internal dialogue"? You 
hopefully do not expect our "internal dialogue" to resemble the "external
dialogue"?

>Someone could, I suppose, object to a bias against certain algorithms
>(table lookup, perhaps).  But I am supposing that we would have good
>reasons for our conclusions.  We wouldn't just say "it's inconceivable
>that a table lookup program could be conscious".  And the same applies

This is exactly how Searle and a lot of people argue: 'It is inconceivable
that shuffling bits of paper would create understanding', or 'if so you could
have understanding in a system of water pipes', or 'in a school of fish' etc.,
etc. We had plenty of examples of such "reasoning" in this group.

>in other cases.  I'm not suggesting that we go with appearances or
>give into prejudices.  Indeed, if it's impossible to have good reasons
>for anything but TT-criteria, that's fine with me, provided that the
>impossibility is shown.
>
It is easy to construct your requirements for such a proof of impossibility
in such a way that it is impossible to satisfy them, all in good faith and 
in name of science, but in fact out of hostility to an idea of using words
"understanding", "intelligence", "consciousnes" in a context not involving
humans.
.........
>>What you talking about above cannot be established from outside, so
>>it is useless and a waste of time in discussing if and how TT is appropiate.
>
>How do you know it can't be established from outside?  We may never
>know for sure, but there are all kinds of things we can't know for
>sure.  That doesn't stop us from drawing conclusions that we regard
>as reliable in practice.
>
As reliable practice we judge "intelligence" etc., of others on basis of 
a sort of TT.

>Besides, if you take the view that consciousness and so forth
>cannot be established from outside, that rules out the TT as a
>test for such things.  It hadn't seemed that that was your position,
>but I may have misunderstood you.
>
I am puzzled by your comment. "inside" or "outside" referred to other
criteria of consciousness than behavior (in a general sense) i.e. this
subjective knowledge that 'I am conscious'.
........
>>The same thing which you use to detect that other human beings have mental
>>life. Or are deciding about it on the basis of their facial contortions,
>>body language etc? Dont't you make conclusions about people's mental life
>>on the basis of letters, for instance?
>
>Rather than trying to make out that I'm evil, why don't you
>say what it is that you think is important in the teletype
>TT?
>
Again you seem to interpret my statements as a personal attack on you.
This is puzzling. I have number of times said that what is important in 
teletype TT is that it is relatively bias-free way of judging, which we also
rutinely use with other people. I am sure you do it too, and I was trying to 
make you aware of this.
........
>>>It seems to me that at present we on our strongest ground when dealing
>>>with entities that are most similar to us: animals, especially
>>>mammals, and better yet primates.  This is a different approach
>>
>>Then dolphins have no chance, they shouldn't even apply, right?
>
>Why are you taking such an extreme view of what I said?
>
Just above you refer to criterion of similarity and basically say that 
"the more similar they are, so more sure I'd be", dont't you? Read again your
own statements. Even though in another place you have conceded that "looks"
should not count! So how should I interpret the above? Why are we on "strongest
ground ..." even though we know of no reason why similarity should count?
Dolphins are not only different in looks, the structure of their brain
is also somewhat different.

>I didn't say they had no chance, only that at present our conclusions
>are on firmer ground when considering animals more simular to us.

Why? Unless you can point out why the similarity should count, this is pure
bias if it refers to anything else but brain structure.

>I fully expect that we'll be able to do better in the future.
........
>We know, though perhaps not absolutely and for sure because of the
>other-minds problem, that humans are conscious; and we have good
>reasons to suppose that consciousness is realized in the brain.  
>And we may be finding out what some of the relevant features of the
>brain and nervous system are.  It's not unreasonable to suppose 
>that animals that are similar physically may also be similar mentally.
>(Behavioral evidence can also be considered, of course.)
>
Since we know that mind resides in brain, only similarity of brain structure
can count. Why having four limbs or being a mammal should count?
And, yes, if something is sufficiently similar physically (brain of course),
we can expect similar effects. But different brain structure cannot be an
argument against, if we do not know how the effects in question (intelligence,
etc.) are produced.
.......
>>Fine. However, as far as I can see, your reluctance to throw the towel in is
>>based on emotional grounds, and not any empirical evidence. 
>
>Throw in the towel and admit what?  That we already know the TT
>is sufficient?  Why should I admit something that's not the case.
>
Admit that if something (someone) shows an "intelligent" behavior, we are in 
no position to deny it this label.
Are you suggesting that one day we may have a better method of deciding if
soemthing is intelligent tha TT/behavior, right? In other words, no matter 
what a person does, how she/he behaves, we will test him/her using these
new criteria and pass a judgment, perhaps give out certificates, deny some
privileges etc?

>-- jd


-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
