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From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and consciousness
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 1994 19:47:25 GMT
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In article <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>In article <Czu580.2Fv@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
>Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>I don't understand why people have so much difficulty with that
>>"Platonic" view.  Calling it Platonic seems a bit prejudicial to
>>me; I prefer "realism" (a common term for it in philosophy).
>>It's similar to realism about the physical world: e.g. that stars,
>>etc existed before there was anyone around to observe them.
>>
>I think that using the word "realism" is prejudical, because it implies that
>they are real, which is debatable.

All it implies is that something is the case, not that there are
any extra entities or substances.

> Why is "Platonic" prejudical?

Because it brings in Plato's world of ideal forms, which is not
any part of realism about mental properties.

>>Certainly the idea that something might be the case even though
>>I can't tell doesn't bother me; moreover, there must be many things
>>of that sort.  E.g. did Napoleon have an egg for breakfast 3 days
>>after his 7th birthday?  (I'm trying to pick something that won't
>>be in any records -- substitute a different example if there's one
>>you prefer.)
>>
>If you allow that the above fact is not in any records, then there is no way
>to establish it and then it does not make sense for me to discuss if this
>was a case or not. Claiming that it is a "matter of fact" what he had for
>breakfast on that day even if it cannot be possibly established comes down to
>misuse of words, very much as argued by Wittgenstein.

Nonehteless, Napoleon did either eat an egg or not for breakfast
that day (counting not hvaing breakfast on the didn't eat an egg
for breakfast side).  That's all I mean by saying there's a fact.
If Wittgenstein's an anti-realist about the past, then I'd say
he's wrong.

>>The idea of methods "in principle" is rather tricky in itself.
>>Could I in principle know the truth about Napoleon's egg?  Is
>>time travel acceptable?  If so, I'm not sure why mental states
>>are wupposed to be less accessible.  Or what about historical 
>>records.  If having someone tell me is succifient, then perhaps
>>it's sufficient for mental states as well.  Anyway, I'm not
>>sure how we should determine what's allowed in principle.
>>
>Yes, it can be tricky.

Amazing.  Agreement.

>>BTW, your view sounds like verificationist to me.  Perhaps
>>we can at least determine whether it is verificationist.  
>>
>I am not sure of an exact definition of a verificationism. It might be 
>(hopefully you do not mean it as a term of abuse).

I have in mind (roughly) the view that statements are meaningless
unless they can in principle be verified.  I don't regard it as a
term of abuse, but I do regard it as incorrect.

>>>I do not think there is a unique way of deciding between these two 
>>>philosophical positions, except perhaps Occam's razor which favors the second
>>>one.
>>
>>Why do you say Occam's razor favors it?  I could see Occam's razor
>
>Because it is more 'economical' - it does not require claiming existance of
>things which are not necessary.

Why is it more economical?  I'm not sure what you're getting at
here.

>>working against, say, physical objects, if we could explain our
>>experience without bringing them in.  But we still ordinarily allow
>
>I do not understand - how can some objects be physical if our experience 
>does not in some sense interact with them? What is your definition of
>"physical"?

I didn't say the objects could be physical if our experience 
does not interact with them.  I said we might (well, "if...")
be able to explain experience w/o including physical objects
in the explanation.

>>that physical objects exist.  So if Occam's razor isn't always a
>>decisive factor, why would it be so effective when it came to
>>realism about mental states (which doesn't, after all, involve
>>any extra entities per se).
>
>Again I do not understand. What do you mean by: "So if Occam's razor isn't 
>always a decisive factor" ? 

I mean that in some cases where Occam's razor would pick A over B
we nonetheless pick B and regard that as correct.

>And the point is that if mental states are
>physical states of a physical brain system. If they are, then there should
>be an "objective" (independent of the brain having them) way of establishing
>it. If this cannot be done, then Occam's razor cuts them off - they are not
>necessary to explain functioning of the brain.

I think I actually agree with that.

-- jd
