Newsgroups: sci.skeptic,alt.consciousness,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!das-news2.harvard.edu!news2.near.net!howland.reston.ans.net!cs.utexas.edu!utnut!utgpu!pindor
From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Penrose and Searle (was Re: Roger Penrose's fixed ideas)
Message-ID: <CzzuEu.F48@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <CzH78F.4Eq@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <CzqHIB.1nA@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <CzsHMy.B9n@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <CzuAD4.4K6@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Distribution: inet
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 20:04:05 GMT
Lines: 168
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.skeptic:96529 comp.ai.philosophy:22765 sci.philosophy.meta:15086

In article <CzuAD4.4K6@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
..........
>I'm not so sure the TT is all that's available.  We at least
>have access to more information that is revealed by the ordinary,
>teletype TT.  So why is one particular kind of evidence picked
>out as the bird in the hand?  (Which version of the TT do you
>say is the bird, BTW, or is it such tests in general?)
>
This particular evidence was picked by Turing, so as to isolate ourselves
from human biases. Otherwise, you would be suggesting that classifying
someone as 'conscious' depends on what he/she looks like, whetehr he/she
has acceptable body laqnguage etc. This brings out in force a mutlitude of
cultural biases (if someone is black, can he/she be really conscious? Or
makes totally inappropriate gestures and body sounds? How about severely
deformed humans?). There is naturally also a danger of cultural biases
in case of verbal resonses, as controversy about "Bell Curve" illustrates,
but again this is the best we can do. And in fact, would imitating human
appearence contribute to creating consciousness? Obviously Turing was very
conscious of how much people are influenced by (even subconscious) emotional
biases in supposedly `objective scientific' pursuits. I do not think you are
taking this into account enough.

........
>Indeed, I'd like to see more discussion of (particulars of) the TT
>rather than less.
>
To be able to discuss particulars of the TT one has to have more precise
defintions of what one wants to establish. Since you are refusing to discuss
definitions (of consciousnes, understanding, etc), you are in no position 
to ask for particulars of TT.

>>Argument about TT is meant to focus attention on the fact that (or whether)
>>the only criterion of intelligence (artificial or otherwise) is a sum of
>>responses of a system to external inputs (i.e. its behavior). Naturally 'sum'
>>is not meant to be literal sum.
>
>But that still leaves a lot of room for variation (in what behavior
>we select as significant).
>
Right. Any suggestions?

>>>My position is not that there *is* more to thinking, intelligence,
>>>or whatever, BTW.  OTOH, it seems plausible to me that some aspects
>>>of mental life (or indeed whether there is any mental life) might
>>>depend on how the TT-passing behavior is accomplished.
>>>
>>Please specify what you mean by "mental life". Certainly internal states and
>>processes of the system have to have a specific (in some range) structure for
>>the system to be able to pass TT. Do you mean something else by "mental life"?
>
>I mean such things as whether something is conscious, whether it
>has an internal dialogue (e.g. like when I think to myself "what
>should I say next?"), and what emotions it has (or can have).
>
Weren't we talking about giving TT to some external (to you, me and others)
entity? What you talking about above cannot be established from outside, so
it is useless and a waste of time in discussing if and how TT is appropiate.

>Here's another example.  In the 1st Terminator film, the terminator
>sometimes gets an internal visual display of options for what to say.
>Now, most of us at least aren't wired up so that that kind of thing
>goes through our visual system in that way.  So this is a difference
>between our mental life and his.  Moreover, it's likely that the
>difference is because of some hardware/software differences betweem
>us and terminators; and it may be that some differences of that sort 
>(I don't say between us and terminators specifically) cannot be detected
>by certain behavioral tests.  (Maybe, for instance, the teletype TT 
>isn't enough.)
>
Could people know from outside (except movie audience) that the Terminator
gets this visual display? If not, it is completely irrelevent. The example
also shows the dangers of using human biases if 'soemthing' is not 
sufficiently like us. If you what to make a part of definition of consciousness
to be "what humans have", that's fine, but then you might have to accept
for instance a defintion of intelligence as determined by IQ test constructed
with a specific cultural bias.

........
>If I were faced with some TTT- (or even TT-) passing entity, I'd
>look to see what birds were to hand, sure.  Indeed, this kind of
>issue comes up right now, in a somewhat different form, when it
>comes to animal consciousness.  However, if we have an explanation
>that does not involve consciousness, it may make sense to prefer
>it.  Part of the debate about animal consciousness takes that form.
>(See, for instance, Kennedy, _The New Anthropomorphism_.)
>
No one however, as far as I know, suggests making decision on basis of
physical differences between human and ape's brains.

>What I had in mind in the passage quoted just above was whether
>we could not consider what various features of a given test detect.
>Or, to put it another way, what kinds of test are required if
>they're to reliably detect particular aspects of mental life?
>If the teletype TT can determine whether something is conscious
>or not, what is it about the teletype TT that does the trick?
>
The same thing which you use to detect that other human beings have mental
life. Or are deciding about it on the basis of their facial contortions,
body language etc? Dont't you make conclusions about people's mental life
on the basis of letters, for instance?

>So: what are the aspects of the TT that make it be such that
>anything that passes it *must* have subjective experience, qualia,
>etc?  (If that's what we think passing it shows.)
See above. I agree that we put a lot of stake in, for instance, a tone of 
voice, but this also makes us prey to cultural biases. 

>>If this is not what you mean, then please say what more does _your_ behavior
>>show, which would prove that _you_ *must* have all of the above. Your question
>>is not out of bounds, it is just empty of content. How do you propose to
>>determine if Koko the gorilla (or a chimp) is conscious, other than checking
>>if it passes TTT? 
>
>That will depend on what I know about consciousness, the workings
>of the brain, gorillas, and on what I know about Turing-style tests.
>I'd like to know more about those tests, along the lines suggested
>above.  If I have to make the decision right now, of course, then
>I'm stuck with what I already know.  What I know now suggests it's
>not necessary for a gorilla to pass something as tough as the TTT.
>
>>It seems to me that we do not disagree about the facts: present state of 
>>knowledge does not indicate a possibility of criteria for consciousnes other
>>then (T)TT. 
>
>If I recall correctly, the TTT is still confined to externally visible
>behavior.  That is, it doesn't include anything about internal workings.

Because we judge other people without going into their internal workings. If
you say you are not prejudiced, why are you making the test for AI tougher?

>It seems to me that at poresent we on our strongest ground when dealing
>with entities that are most similar to us: animals, especially
>mammals, and better yet primates.  This is a different approach

Then dolphins have no chance, they shouldn't even apply, right?

>than the TTT, since the TTT is more in the line of testing abstract
>capabilities.
>
>Animals don't (so far) pass the TT or the TTT, but I think that *at
>present* at least physical similarity (to humans) gives us stronger
>grounds than if we stick to externally visible behavior.  This is not

Since we do not have any scientific grounds to claim a connection between 
physical similarity and presence (or not) of consciousness, you are clearly 
accepting a role of cultural biases - not a very scientific approach :-(.
........
>
>>However, our ways part immediately after this: I think that it
>>may be possible that this is due to a nature of the phenomenon (consciousness)
>>and consequently no other criterion will be found. You, OTOH, are not yet
>>prepared to throw the towel in. Is the a roughly accurate assesment of our
>>disagreement?
>
>Roughly, yes.
>
Fine. However, as far as I can see, your reluctance to throw the towel in is
based on emotional grounds, and not any empirical evidence. 

>-- jeff
>
Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
