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From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Penrose and Searle (was Re: Roger Penrose's fixed ideas)
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Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 18:12:10 GMT
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In article <CzuCBz.80z@cwi.nl> olaf@cwi.nl (Olaf Weber) writes:

>Searle seems to think that the material from which the brain is
>constructed is important, but get (IMHO) rather vague when he has to
>demonstrate exactly _how_ that could matter.

That's because he doesn't know.  Nor does anyone else.

>  To me, the restriction seems rather parochial:
>  he refers to the "neuronal chauvinism" that
>only entities with neurons like our own can have mental states(*), but
>cheerfully makes the same mistake (IMHO) elsewhere in his arguments.

Could you say where?  I assume the ref below is to where he talks
of "neural chauvinism" rather than to where he makes the same mistake.

>(*) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Chapter 2 section III, page 38 in the
>MIT paperback edition.

-- jeff



