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From: lupton@luptonpj.demon.co.uk (Peter Lupton)
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Subject: Re: Is Common Sense Explicit or Implicit?
References: <354if2$16n@mp.cs.niu.edu> <352k26$1ul@mp.cs.niu.edu> <353hhu$fov@search01.news.aol.com>
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Date: Sat, 17 Sep 1994 13:56:05 +0000
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In article: <354if2$16n@mp.cs.niu.edu>  rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
 
> 
> It is very easy to say:
> 
> 	He attempted A.  Therefore he must have believed B.
> 
> and then to follow on with:
> 
> 	Because of his belief of B, he attempted A.  We have here
> 	a nice empirical theory, whereby beliefs cause actions.
> 
> The trouble with this is that it is all pseudo-science.  It is
> circular reasoning.  On the basis of behavior you attribute a belief,
> and then you use that attributed belief to predict the behavior.
> 
> In order to genuinely demonstrate that beliefs have a causal role in
> behavior, you would need a reliable way of measuring beliefs which
> was independent of the type of behavior it was supposed to predict.
> Otherwise the beliefs are not mental states of the person who is said
> to have the beliefs -- they are merely formal constructs of the
> observer who is trying to come up with an explanation of that
> person's behavior.

The argument is that in order for a theory beliefs not to be pseudo-science,
the following condition (at least) must hold:
 
that "you would need a reliable way of measuring beliefs which
 was independent of the type of behavior it was supposed to predict"

In general, then, in order for a theory of X not to be pseudo-science
then at least the following must hold:
 
  there is a reliable way of measuring X independent of the type
  of effects X is supposed to predict.

However, I don't see that this discriminates between scientific
theories and folk psychology. It hinges on our understanding
of "independent" and "type". Is asking some-one what they believe
a separate type from watching what they do? Is reading a voltmeter
needle a separate type from seeing a gold leaf move?

I just don't see that Neil has drawn a line that discriminates
science on the one hand from beliefs on the other. In many cases
we can easily determine whether people have beliefs and then
check the effects of having such beliefs. Of course, one can always
think of other cases - but this would be the case for scientific
theories also (instruments being broken, experimenters being drunk, 
etc.).

And then this notion of "independent". Isn't a measurement of X
just another effect of X? There is no difference in principle
(no special communion with the essence of X-ness) which distinguishes
the measurement of X from measurement of other effects X may have.
Instead we see a whole web of inter-related effects which can be
related to theory. Some effects related more directly to the terms
of the theory than others - these tend to be associated with 
measurement.

Other than the fact that beliefs are part of folk psychology, 
which is part of common sense and so cannot be the discovery 
of the scientific community, I fail to see what difference in 
principle there is between beliefs and scientific posits.

-------------------
Peter Lupton
