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Article 6951 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding
Message-ID: <BILL.92Sep17011622@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu>
Date: 17 Sep 92 08:16:22 GMT
References: <BuDr7y.1LA@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> <20390@plains.NoDak.edu>
	<1992Sep16.203451.5162@spss.com> <1992Sep17.001119.19562@Princeton.EDU>
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In-Reply-To: harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU's message of 17 Sep 92 00: 11:19 GMT

harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) writes:

    >         [ . . . ]
    > Hence "Strong AI," the hypothesis that cognition is symbol
    > manipulation, is incorrect, as Searle has argued. 

I think there is a missing link here.  The argument demonstrates that
*intentionality* cannot arise merely from symbol manipulation, but it
isn't immediately obvious that cognition implies intentionality.

	-- Bill


