From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!secapl!Cookie!frank Tue Nov 24 10:52:41 EST 1992
Article 7701 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!secapl!Cookie!frank
>From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Message-ID: <1992Nov21.211537.130472@Cookie.secapl.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 21:15:37 GMT
References: <1992Nov17.152753.13786@oracorp.com>
Organization: Security APL, Inc.
Lines: 21

In article <1992Nov17.152753.13786@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>When you try to understand what G means, by interpreting the "diagonalizing"
>>operator, you get an infinite regress (in fact, a simple self-reference, but
>>it is not difficult to construct examples using diagonalization where the
>>references are not self-referential, but do produce an infinite regress).
>
>There is no infinite regress! To understand what G means, you only
>need to know (1) what diagonalization means, and (2) what it means for
>David Chalmers to believe something. [...]
>
>The only way that G becomes paradoxical is if we assume that David
>Chalmers is so smart that he believes something if and only if it is
>true. In that case, G reduces to the Liar Paradox, which I admit does
>cause problems.

IMO, it is sufficient to make G paradoxical that the meaning of G is
*relevant* to whether David Chalmers believes it.  (Actually, "paradoxical"
is not quite the right word; 'This sentence is true.' is not precisely
paradoxical; but it (on most accounts, including mine) shares the
unacceptability of "This statement is false.".)


