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Article 7653 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Message-ID: <tim.721885043@giaeb>
Date: 16 Nov 92 03:37:23 GMT
References: <tim.720580709@giaeb> <1992Nov2.195050.1296@wixer.cactus.org> <tim.721445310@giaeb> <28024@castle.ed.ac.uk>
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cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <tim.721445310@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) writes:

>>For the first case, I suggest an examination of siamese twins, or twins who
>>have never been separated.  Many such cases exist, and I would claim tend to
>>support this hypothesis.

>True. Some twins who have spent their lives together behave like one
>person, claim to think as one, and prefer to be treated as one person.

>>For the second case, take people with damaged brains, especially those who
>>have (for one reason or another) so-called 'split brains'.  Behaviour patterns
>>here seem again to support the hypothesis.

>True. In some circumstances two different consciousnesses, with
>different perceptions, and different purposes, can be discerned.

>>If you think this is hugely counter-intuitive, you're right.  I don't like
>>admitting any more than you do that there is no clear distinction between me
>>and everything else.  But if there isn't, then consciousness becomes so
>>changed as a concept that it's hardly worth using the term any more.  Rather
>>like phlogiston, in fact.

>You seem to argue that the changes in the concept of consciousness
>necessary to encompass these phenomena are so unpalatable that you
>prefer to heave the bathwater, baby and all, out of the window. I'm
>very sorry to hear this. Have you consulted a philosophical therapist
>about this problem?

Well, I couldn't find any listed in the yellow pages.  Seriously, I didn't
intend to throw the baby out.  It's just that almost all discussion (here and
in other places) seems to ASSUME that consciousness is very much first-person
stuff, very unique to each individual, and that everyone has a different
one....what I am arguing is that such a concept doesn't appear to me to stand
up to much scrutiny - and if it doesn't, I'm not sure its meaningful to talk
about whether or not a particular machine "has" consciousness.

Maybe I'm not expressing myself all that clearly...


Tim


