From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!darwin.sura.net!spool.mu.edu!agate!doc.ic.ac.uk!uknet!edcastle!cam Tue Nov 24 10:51:08 EST 1992
Article 7565 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: definition of consciousness
Message-ID: <27907@castle.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 10 Nov 92 10:22:46 GMT
References: <3197@ucl-cs.uucp>
Organization: Edinburgh University
Lines: 28

In article <3197@ucl-cs.uucp> G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) writes:
>Chris Malcolm writes:

> > ... consciousness is not a brain phenomenon. It's a property of a
> > mind-engaged-in-a-world. You'll no more find consciousness in a brain
> > than in an eyeball, although both have useful contributions to make.

>So the big C does not exist? And what of Mind: what's that?

Some confusion here. At least I'ld better make it clear that a) I
believe in consciousness as a qualitatively special mental mode of
humans, probably not extending even in its most primitive forms
much beyond the higher vertebrates; and b) I can't imagine how my
posting quoted above could be interpreted as implying that I didn't.

In fact, while my remark quoted above referred to consciousness, I
think it generally true of most mental terms, such as "understand",
"intend", "believe", etc., including cases, such as beetles -- if we
presume for the sake of argument that beetles are not conscious, but
can still know things and have purposes.

Perhaps Gordon espouses a specific model of consciousness, such as the
inner-eye model, and supposes that this is the only possible model of
consciousness which can support the everyday use of the term?
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205


