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Article 7529 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
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In article <aV0TTB3w165w@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz> system@CODEWKS.nacjack.gen.nz (Wayne McDougall) writes:

>But surely now we are back to a paradox? Unless you are trying to 
>separate "believing" from "co-incidentally agreeing with". If David 
>Chalmers doesn't believe it because it is self-referential, than David 
>Chalmers is agreeing with it (ie he doesn't believe the sentence). 
>Surely if he agree with it, he believes it? But then he isn't agreeing 
>with it?
>
>Perhaps we should ask David? ;-)

Surely I'm the *last* person you should ask.  You people seem to at
least have a clue about what's going on with G.  Me, I'm just very
confused about it. :-)

However, even I can tell that it's not valid to infer that I agree with
G from the fact that I don't believe G.  (You can infer that G is true,
but that's a different matter.)

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


