From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!asuvax!ncar!noao!amethyst!organpipe.uug.arizona.edu!organpipe.uug.arizona.edu!bill Mon Aug 24 15:41:21 EDT 1992
Article 6657 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Freewill
Message-ID: <BILL.92Aug19170309@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu>
Date: 20 Aug 92 00:03:09 GMT
References: <Bt4xt1.MA0.1@cs.cmu.edu> <1992Aug19.210204.29868@mp.cs.niu.edu>
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Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
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In-Reply-To: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu's message of 19 Aug 92 21: 02:04 GMT

rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:

   > Here is one way of looking at free will.
   >
   > [ . . . ]

Very reasonable, I think.  I'd just like to add that there's a book by
Daniel Dennett called "Elbow room: The varieties of free will worth
wanting", that discusses these issues thoroughly, readably, and, to me
at least, convincingly.

Anyway, the crucial point -- which just about every important
philosopher (from Aristotle to Rickert) agrees on -- is that the
question of freedom is not *whether* actions are determined, but *how*
they are determined.

	-- Bill


