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Article 5264 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: barryp@otago.ac.nz
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence, awareness, and esthetics
Message-ID: <1992Apr26.111908.2640@otago.ac.nz>
Date: 25 Apr 92 22:19:08 GMT
References: <1992Apr20.191345.27706@javelin.sim.es.com>   <1992Apr24.182714.17683@javelin.sim.es.com>
Organization: University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
Lines: 75

In article <1992Apr24.182714.17683@javelin.sim.es.com>, biesel@javelin.sim.es.com (Heiner Biesel) writes:
> pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
> 
>>In article <1992Apr23.152759.2272@javelin.sim.es.com> biesel@javelin.sim.es.com (Heiner Biesel) writes:
>>(in reply to Daryl McCullough)
>>>
>>>As I recall, the Turing test is a pretty simple affair, consisting
>>>of a couple of teletype machines and a human interlocutor who is
>>>challenged to decide which - if any - of the two teletypes is connected
>>>to a computer, and which is manned by a person. Nothing is said about
>>>any special qualifications of any human in this arrangement, and the
>>>antire arrangement invites an attempt at mimicry, rather than deep
>>>understanding or awareness. Implicit in the formulation of the test
>>>by Turing was the assumption that human beings are rather good at
>>>detecting simple mimicry, and that it ultimately does not matter
>>>how the effect is achieved, if it fools people it is good enough, an
>>>operationalist definition of intelligence.
>>>
> 
>>You seem to suggest that Turing was so stupid as not to see a difference 
>>between real intelligence and good mimicry of one.
> 
> I see no reason to accept the Turing test as inherently infallible, or
> even particularly well defined.
> 
> Any practical test must obviously have bounded criteria. The number and 
> qualifications of the judges, for example, as well as the period of
> testing, must be defined. "Fooling all of the people all of the time"
> is hardly rigorous, and not realizable in any case.
> 
> Your conception of the Turing test seems to differ substantially from mine.
> Would you please state it simply, so that we can see where the difference
> lies?
> 
> 
> I am suggesting that the Turing test would be sufficient for some but not
> all people, and that that is probably true of any other such test as well.
> As for me, an example of creative art would suffice. This suggests a series
> of alternative tests, each designed to demonstrate some aspect of what
> we call intelligence and awareness. The Turing test simply exploits
> verbal capability as a possible indicator of awareness, to the exclusion
> of all other aspects. I fail to understand the almost religious zeal
> with which some people defend the Turing test as *THE* means of establishing
> intelligence - and by inference, awareness - in machines. This zeal seems to
> be at odds with the spirit of the test, which is, after all, a loosely defined
> and easily staged informal affair, surely intended as such by Saint Alan
> himself.
> 
> 
My understanding of "the" Turing test is as a means of distancing the subject
from the prejudices of the observer.  A computer passes the test if its
responses are such as to convince the observer that it is intelligent (compared
to a human under the same conditions).  When the test was proposed the
human- machine interfaces were pretty primitive and the teletype was the
obvious means of communication between subjects and observer.  In recent
competitions computers have done pretty well at this test.

We could postulate other tests (eg the ability to guide a robot through a maze,
or the ability to recognize objects in a photgraph etc) but the essential
point is that we only know somthing (someone) is intelligent by observing their
behaviour.  We are prejudiced towards thinking that humans are intelligent and
so some test needs to be devised that separates the observer from the subject.

Creativity (as in composing music or painting works of art) is a very special
facet of intelligence.  I don't see any reason why a concerto composed by a
machine couldn't be performed before an audience and them be unaware that it
was not a human creation.  There have been displays of computer art that (to
me anyway) seem just as interesting as many human creations.  These would
all be valid tests in addition to the Turing test.

At some point you have to make up your mind whether I am an intelligent being
or just a clever imitation.  you can't expect to wait an infinite time or
test every posible aspect of an intelligent being's repertoire.

Barry Phease


