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Article 5246 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: biesel@javelin.sim.es.com (Heiner Biesel)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence, awareness, and esthetics
Message-ID: <1992Apr24.182714.17683@javelin.sim.es.com>
Date: 24 Apr 92 18:27:14 GMT
References: <1992Apr20.191345.27706@javelin.sim.es.com> <1992Apr21.221135.20165@ccu.umanitoba.ca> <1992Apr23.152759.2272@javelin.sim.es.com> <1992Apr24.154950.25222@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: Evans & Sutherland Computer Corporation
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pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:

>In article <1992Apr23.152759.2272@javelin.sim.es.com> biesel@javelin.sim.es.com (Heiner Biesel) writes:
>(in reply to Daryl McCullough)
>>
>>As I recall, the Turing test is a pretty simple affair, consisting
>>of a couple of teletype machines and a human interlocutor who is
>>challenged to decide which - if any - of the two teletypes is connected
>>to a computer, and which is manned by a person. Nothing is said about
>>any special qualifications of any human in this arrangement, and the
>>antire arrangement invites an attempt at mimicry, rather than deep
>>understanding or awareness. Implicit in the formulation of the test
>>by Turing was the assumption that human beings are rather good at
>>detecting simple mimicry, and that it ultimately does not matter
>>how the effect is achieved, if it fools people it is good enough, an
>>operationalist definition of intelligence.
>>

>You seem to suggest that Turing was so stupid as not to see a difference 
>between real intelligence and good mimicry of one.

I am not commenting on Turing's intelligence, but rather the efficacy
of the test proposed by him. I suspect that the difference between
"real" intelligence and a good mimicry of one is sufficiently subtle
to require some thought, rather than a simple dismissal. Since the
debate in this forum has in fact revolved around just this distinction,
I see no reason to accept the Turing test as inherently infallible, or
even particularly well defined.

>>To reiterate: the Turing test does *not* depend on being able to fool
>>all the people all the time; hell, even I can't do that.
>>
>No! Turing test *depends* on not being able to fool all the people all 
>the time.                    ^^^
                        (I assume you meant to elide this)

Really? Then I submit that no machine can ever be said to have successfully
passed the Turing test, since it requires - by your definition - an
infinite amount of time to demonstrate.

Any practical test must obviously have bounded criteria. The number and 
qualifications of the judges, for example, as well as the period of
testing, must be defined. "Fooling all of the people all of the time"
is hardly rigorous, and not realizable in any case.

Your conception of the Turing test seems to differ substantially from mine.
Would you please state it simply, so that we can see where the difference
lies?

>>>If on the other hand computers were programmed to produce
>>>music, then you would consider that awareness? Utter BS!
>>>No, awareness requires a demonstration of that awareness,
>>>and only the Turing test is available to demonstrate to
>>>a high degree the awareness exhibited.
>>
>>This, I assume, is pronounced ex cathedra, and is hence infallible?
>>
>Do you have any better way of establishing awareness? Your 'Borodin
>symphony' test would fail most people, as you've agreed yourself so I do not
>think it is an alternative.

I am suggesting that the Turing test would be sufficient for some but not
all people, and that that is probably true of any other such test as well.
As for me, an example of creative art would suffice. This suggests a series
of alternative tests, each designed to demonstrate some aspect of what
we call intelligence and awareness. The Turing test simply exploits
verbal capability as a possible indicator of awareness, to the exclusion
of all other aspects. I fail to understand the almost religious zeal
with which some people defend the Turing test as *THE* means of establishing
intelligence - and by inference, awareness - in machines. This zeal seems to
be at odds with the spirit of the test, which is, after all, a loosely defined
and easily staged informal affair, surely intended as such by Saint Alan
himself.

>>You seem to think of the Turing test as some generic means of establishing
>>awareness on the part of others; t'aint so. I have no idea of what you
>>mean by "...this ingraining of knowledge was hard-won though carefull (sic)
>>Turing testing."
>>
>Obviously you do not fully appreciate what 'Turing test' means.

Perhaps you could explain to what the quoted sentence means,
and how I can come to fully appreciate what 'Turing test' means? I am
thus far unaware of any "Turing testing" of any machine intelligence,
the occasional playing with Eliza clones excepted. The programs I know
about are without exception abysmally stupid and totally devoid of anything
approaching awareness. 

Regards,
       Heiner biesel@thrall.sim.es.com


