From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo Thu Apr 16 11:34:40 EDT 1992
Article 5111 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: What counts as the "Right" functional organization?
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Apr14.064526.16723@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Apr14.142239.7807@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Apr14.181138.8475@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Message-ID: <1992Apr15.173215.20588@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 1992 17:32:15 GMT

In article <1992Apr14.181138.8475@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In article <1992Apr14.142239.7807@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>>In article <1992Apr14.064526.16723@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>>>No, not necessarily.  A functionalist need only hold that beliefs result
>>>from the *right* functional organization, not from any old functional
>>>organization.
>
>>Okay, then you'd better start specifying what counts as the "right" functional
>>organization lest you slip into a Davidsonian circle.  Actually, snarkiness
>>aside, I'm honestly interested in what might count as right and not right.
>
> I hope we can avoid discussions of "what is the right functional organization
>for belief (or understanding, etc)."  A discussion of "what is the right
>functional organization" might be ok.  But once you pin it to terms such
>as 'belief' or 'understanding' or 'semantics' you run into the problem of
>these terms not being sufficiently well defined, and the discussion will
>quickly degenerate into arguments about issues that are not really central.
>
It's hard to tell, but it sounds like you're trying to avoid discussion of
what might be the "right" functional organization because you believe it
will ultimately be fruitless. My intuitions concur. This is why I would never
say something like "belief" (or any other propositional attitude, for that
matter) is a matter of the "right" anything. If you're going to talk about
functional organization, and you're not willing to be committed to the
McCarthian belief that all functional states constitute mental
states (though perhaps "small" ones, whatever those might be), then
you better be prepared to say which ones count and which don't. Chalmers
distinguishes between them by offering the promisory note of "rightness".
Do you have a better demarcation?



-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
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