From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!watserv1!watdragon!logos.waterloo.edu!cpshelle Thu Apr 16 11:33:24 EDT 1992
Article 4982 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!watserv1!watdragon!logos.waterloo.edu!cpshelle
>From: cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: syntax and semantics
Message-ID: <1992Apr8.135613.4521@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Sender: news@watdragon.waterloo.edu (USENET News System)
Organization: University of Waterloo
References: <1992Apr03.164328.8107@spss.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 13:56:13 GMT
Lines: 58

markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
> Whoa there-- I don't think you can drag the linguists onto your bandwagon.
> Linguists and philosophers don't seem to use "semantics" in the same way.
> When linguists talk about "semantics", or a certain MIT linguist talks about
> "the semantic component of a grammar", they have in mind something about as
> formal, symbolic, and computable as the thing they call "syntax."

I think we can safely include computational linguists as disputants in
the syntax and semantics logomachy.  Some `Schankians' have claimed
that syntax is basically a `surface' effect of semantics, while others
of a different ilk have attached intrinsic semantic meaning to
syntactic structure.  Personally, I doubt there is any pure separation
to be had in reality.

> Searle seems to use "syntactic" to mean "formal", or "manipulating...
> symbols [with] precisely stated rules."  "Semantics" he seems to equate
> with reference.  Perhaps these are standard usages in philosophy, but they
> would not allow one to make sense of most discussions of syntax and
> semantics in linguistics.
> 
> Would it be a fair restatement of Searle's axiom, to say that "Formal symbol
> manipulation cannot of itself comprise or yield reference"?

In his conclusions of "Can computers think?" in _Minds, Brains, and
Science_, Searle states:

	2.  _Syntax is not sufficient for semantics_.
	    That proposition is a conceptual truth.  It just
	    articulates our distinction between the notion of
	    what has content.

	...

	4.  _Minds have mental contents; specifically, they have
	    semantic contents_.
	    And that, I take it, is just an obvious fact about how
	    our minds work.

Nowhere does Searle actually define what he means by syntax and
semantics other than negatively.  He seems to go through the
properties he ascribes to computer programs (aka formal systems) and
simply asserts that they are `obviously' not properties of
intelligence.  In effect, his defintions of are negatively constructed
and somewhat post hoc.  In conclusion 4, he does equate `semantic'
with `mental', but that doesn't help much.  I would agree, from other
sources, that Searle does *seem* to mean reference however. 

Having studied Searle's views on speech acts, I have a high regard for
Searle's powers of reasoning and observation, but I have also learned
to become wary of what he simply claims is `our' intuition or leaves
as an exercise to the reader.

				Cam
--
      Cameron Shelley        | "Proof, n.  Evidence having a shade more of
cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu  |  plausibility than of unlikelyhood.  The
    Davis Centre Rm 2136     |  testimony of two credible witnesses as
 Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390  |	opposed to that of one."    Ambrose Bierce


