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Article 4896 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Apr3.084449.10635@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 3 Apr 92 13:44:48 GMT
References: <1992Mar31.204900.10676@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Apr2.132116.26024@cs.ucf.edu> <1992Apr2.202206.25306@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
Lines: 37
Nntp-Posting-Host: zariski.harvard.edu

In article <1992Apr2.202206.25306@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes: 

>In article <1992Apr2.132116.26024@cs.ucf.edu> 
>clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke) writes:

TC:
>>You forget that Putnam embeds his rock in the physical world subject to  
>>non-repeating external disturbances.  Thus with proper of identification of  
>>{single state} X {physical states} the single-state machine implements the  
>>5-colour-map-checker, computationally as well as behaviorally.

DC:
>No it doesn't, for the usual reasons.  (I hate to say "strong conditionals"
>again.)

I hate to say "haecceitism with respect to individuals excludes the same
with respect to their properties" again, but it looks like I must.  Perhaps
if your knowledge of modal logic went a bit beyond this parrot-like
invocation (and conflation) of various kinds of necessity, you might have
realized that Kripke's argument against mind-brain identity trivially lifts
to bear against the thesis of supervenience.  But, of course, it would
greatly inconvenience you to actually involve yourself in the substance of
technical issues, whose language you have used with great facility to
disguise the hollowness of your fallacious theses.

`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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