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Article 1230 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cbarber@bbn.com (Chris Barber)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Animal Intelligence vs Human Intelligence
Message-ID: <3867@papaya.bbn.com>
Date: 7 Nov 91 15:17:52 GMT
References: <37311@shamash.cdc.com> <1991Oct24.234823.7560@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com> <37443@shamash.cdc.com> <1991Oct31.235402.12739@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com> <37658@shamash.cdc.com> <1991Nov02.075827.27740kmc@netcom.COM> <37713@shamash.cdc.com> <1991Nov05.08
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In article <37736@shamash.cdc.com> map@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>"Sophistication" is not obtained instantly (if ever).  Learning in humans is
>not a linear process, but more like a spiraling process.  A primitive
>grasp of a new concept can shed light on earlier, related concepts, thus 
>making the grasp of them stronger, which in turn provides a wider context
>for the new concept, making a stronger grasp of it possible.  A child's
>form of grasping concepts like "reason," "logic," etc., *is* less
>sophisticated than an adults, but that less sophisticated grasp is
>a prerequisite for his initial grasp of "lying."  
>
>I think "apparent lying behavior" is just that - apparent behavior that
>does not require conceptualization to perform.  Washoe doesn't have *any*
>grasp (even a primitive one) of the concepts mentioned above, so she 
>can't know what "lying" is.  What looks to us like "lying behavior" is
>explainable in perceptual terms, so I think that positing a conceptual
>faculty in apes on the basis of that behavior is not justified.

You still seem to be caught on assuming what you are trying to prove.
How do you know that Washoe cannot have the concepts you mention, at
least in the same kind of primitive fashion that a child would have?  As
you define them, I see no reason why Washoe cannot have all of the
concepts which you listed.  Of course, Washoe's concept of virtue is
perhaps not a sophisticated one, but as you point out, neither is a
child's.  You say that Washoe's behavior can be explained in purely
perceptual terms, but I don't get the impression that very many people
here are buying the explanation.  As has been pointed out, extreme
behaviorists would explain even very high-level human behavior in
perceptual terms.  Being able to explain something in a particular way
does not rule out alternate explanations.  Remember that Occams's razor
cuts both ways: while it seems reasonable to adopt the explanation for a
behavior which makes the minimum number of assumptions, the assumption of
the absence of an ability is no less presumptive than the assumption of
the presence of that ability.

Of course, the real problem here might be what you mean by conceptual
ability.  One of the problems of this all discussion is that the terms
are so vague, we could all go on forever arguing about this stuff without
ever getting anywhere. I propose that before beating ourselves on the
head anymore on this topic, we should describe the difference between
perceptual ability and conceptual ability in very precise, preferably
mathematical, terms.  Otherwise, this will continue to be fruitless
discussion as far as AI research goes.  I am not prepared to make an
off-the-cuff set of definitions but will think about it....

-- 
Christopher Barber
(cbarber@bbn.com)


