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Article 1734 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Zeleny's argument on denotation, 2nd branch.
Followup-To: sci.philosophy.tech
Date: 28 Nov 91 22:30:32 GMT
Organization: U Texas Dept of Computer Sciences, Austin TX
Lines: 48
Message-ID: <kjarg8INNbsi@cs.utexas.edu>
References: <1991Nov27.115032.5957@husc3.harvard.edu>
Summary: I think we are on a dead-end here.
Keywords: denotation, sense, communication

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In article <1991Nov28.153335.5974@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
> How do you know that?  I believe that in accordance with the analysis I
> present, people, and other signifying beings, indeed enjoy the access to
> transfinite abstract meanings, albeit without complete awareness of so
> doing. ...

I cannot speak for Mr Zeleny, but I have NO awareness that I
"enjoy access to transfinite abstract meanings".  The supposition
that this must be the case, despite my not being aware of it,
and (I presume) despite of any operational way of testing this,
strikes me as an article of faith.

> ... Note that G\"odel in his 1944 and 1964 Russell and Cantor 
> articles made a similar claim, that we enjoy perception-like
> access to transfinite mathematical objects. ...

Mr Zeleny enjoys good company.  If Godel's, the other Russell's,
and Cantor's say-sos do not convince me, I trust that Mr Zeleny
will perceive no slight that I also find his say-so unconvincing.

> ... Prove us wrong.

I suspect this is impossible.  The claim that we "enjoy perception-
like access to transfinite mathematical objects" strikes me as
unassailable, if it is combined with the view that our awareness of
this is "incomplete", undoubtedly in the ways that are needed to
test this supposition.  

RT:
>> I understand the analogy Mr Zeleny draws.  But it does not help.
>> In neither the second branch of his argument, nor this example, do
>> I understand what computational capacity Mr Zeleny attributes to 
>> people that is impossible for machines.

> The computational capacity I am attributing to humans is that of fortuitous
> computability, which often goes above and beyond the effective kind.  This
> is more or less a claim based on mathematical intuition (which you may call
> an article of faith), which I share with Church and Penrose, so feel free
> to disregard it as irrational.

I suspect we are at an impasse.  Barring further argument or 
evidence, I see no more reason to believe in Mr Zeleny's claim
that we have access to some transfinite hierarchy of meaning,
or to some "fortuitous computability", than I have to believe
in others' claims that we have access to the gods.

Russell


