From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!think.com!hsdndev!husc-news.harvard.edu!boucher!zeleny Sun Dec  1 13:06:08 EST 1991
Article 1699 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@boucher.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: On Denoting (was re: Arguments against Machine Intelligence)
Keywords: denotation, sense, communication
Message-ID: <1991Nov27.180755.5967@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 27 Nov 91 23:07:53 GMT
References: <1991Nov27.111048.4933@odin.diku.dk> <1991Nov27.115032.5957@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Nov27.175341.15008@cherokee.uswest.com>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
Lines: 79
Nntp-Posting-Host: boucher.harvard.edu

In article <1991Nov27.175341.15008@cherokee.uswest.com> 
ken@dakota (Kenny Chaffin) writes:

>In article <1991Nov27.115032.5957@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>>Very well, I shall repeat my argument.  It is commonly assumed that
>>computers are capable of symbol manipulation; an analogous claim is
>>sometimes made on behalf of human brains, neural pulses being interpreted
>>as the symbols in question.  However, in considering such claims, we must
>>be careful about what we mean by `symbol'.  In philosophical use, this term
>>is interpreted as a synonym of `sign' (cf. the use by Whitehead), sometimes
>>used as standing for a conventional, substitutive sign (e.g.  by Peirce and
>>Morris), or, alternatively, as an iconic, analogical sign (e.g. by Kant and
>>Hegel).

KAC:
>	So there are lots of ways of using the word. What about the computer-
>science use of symbol? Why must we use the philosophical definition?

Because this definition is the only one that takes into account the
sumbol's property of standing for something else.

MZ:
>>            The problem with identifying such a property is twofold.

KAC:
>	Why only twofold?

It's a dichotomy: either a sign stands for something else in virtue of
expressing a meaning (connoting), or it stands for something else "just
because" (simply denoting), in which case, given that there is no invisible
string connecting it to the object or class of objects denoted by it, we
are forced to postulate a causal connection between the object(s) denoted
and the denoting sign.

MZ:
>>If, on one hand, one identifies the neural pulses as purely denotative
>>signs, ones that refer without expressing, one would be forced to postulate
>>a causal relation in virtue of which these signs denote, stipulating that
>>this causal relation is itself entirely immanent in nervous activity, in
>>direct contradiction to the fact that our language, allegedly founded
>>solely on such nervous activity, has no trouble referring to objects and
>>phenomena that occur outside of the latter.

KAC:
>	Okay, nice long contorted sentence, but that's one hand.

MZ:
>>On the other hand, should one assume that neural pulses are connotative
>>signs, which refer by virtue of expressing an intensional meaning, then
>>such meanings, by the above observation, must be entirely captured in the
>>physical states of the brain.

KAC:
>	And that's the other hand.
> Why must we choose. Why can't a brain
>do both?

Because in each particular case, they are mutually exclusive.  In any case,
if I am right, and if it's an FSA, it can't do either.

>KAC

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