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Article 1465 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@husc9.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Language & Logic
Message-ID: <1991Nov21.111136.5714@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 21 Nov 91 16:11:34 GMT
References: <JMC.91Nov17135110@SAIL.Stanford.EDU> <1991Nov17.190935.5546@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Nov20.214001.2910@vax.oxford.ac.uk>
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In article <1991Nov20.214001.2910@vax.oxford.ac.uk> 
mc703@vax.oxford.ac.uk writes:

>In article <1991Nov17.190935.5546@husc3.harvard.edu>,
>zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

MZ:
>>                         Please note that the burden of providing a finitely
>> representable semantical theory capable of fixing the operational criteria
>> of reference lies on AI researchers like you.

WC:
>Why is everyone fixated with classical semantics?  What does Mikhail make of
>the later Wittgenstein's ideas about language (and maths): he went right off
>truth-conditional semantics as a theory of meaning. Which is not to say that
>he comes up with a replacement "theory" - some people seem to think he was dead
>set against the whole idea.  If anything, he thinks that assertibility
>conditions determine meaning; that language has to be seen as reactions to
>things rather than descriptions along the lines of logic.  He makes the point
>that you can't justify everything you say; if you tried, you would have an
>infinite regress of justifying your justificatory rules (Phil. Investigations,
>para. somewhere-in-the-late-200s - I'll dig it out if anyone is interesteD).
>I think John McDowell & Gareth Evans too have interesting ideas about the role
>of the "constitutive force" of conventions, assumptions and traditions in
>language (and life in general).  (Lots of this stuff is concerned with
>rebutting scepticism based essentially on a classical "objective"
>correspondence outlook).

I must say that I don't hold Wittgenstein, either later or earlier, in
a particularly high regard.  For instance, I find his dismission of
logically complex concepts in the discussion of the concept of `game'
tantamount to a rejection of the rationalist outlook, and, therefore,
a position that doesn't lend itself to rational discussion.  Of
course, you may feel differently; however my semantical considerations
of the AI project can easily be reformulated in terms of assertibility
conditions, and so don't depend on a particular theory.  Finally,
regardless of your feelings on whether the classical objective
correspondence view is true, you can easily discover the obvious
reason why, when constructing a robot, you damn better behave as if
this were the case.

WC:
>My personal opinion is that anything Mikhail would recognize as semantics :-)
>is going to be a bad theory of language, let alone thought in general.  I
>recall reading some stuff by Kripke (Locke Lectures at Oxford University in
>the late 70s) in which he gives various reasons why the Russellian treatment
>of, for example, definite descriptions, is not sufficient for real language:
>what does Mikhail think of Kripke?

Having written extensively on the subject of "Meaning and Necessity"
and "A Puzzle About Belief", Mikhail thinks that Kripke, who fails to
distinguish between expressing a proposition and being able to give an
exhaustive account thereof, is wrong.  Mikhail would be quite happy to
share his manuscripts with all interested parties.

WC:
>Um ... this looks a bit telegraphic but I must zoom off now ...

Do you perchance know where a copy of Kripke's unpublished Locke
Lectures might be found?

>William Chesters, Wadham College, Oxford

 
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
: 872 Massachusetts Ave., Apt. 707                                   :
: Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139                                     :
: (617) 661-8151                                                     :
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:                                                                    :
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'


