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Article 1425 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Daniel Dennett
Message-ID: <1991Nov19.210047.5646@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 20 Nov 91 02:00:44 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1991Nov19.210047.5646
References: <OZ.91Nov17172508@ursa.sis.yorku.ca> <1991Nov18.083024.5560@husc3.harvard.edu> <15019@castle.ed.ac.uk>
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In article <15019@castle.ed.ac.uk> 
cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <1991Nov18.083024.5560@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <OZ.91Nov17172508@ursa.sis.yorku.ca> 
>>oz@ursa.sis.yorku.ca (Ozan Yigit) writes:

OY:
>>>Your charge that Dennett has been intellectually dishonest is a
>>>serious one.  You are no doubt prepared to substentiate this charge,
>>>not with vague generalities, but with specific references to Dennett's
>>>work.

MZ:
>>I am sorry, but I was making a general statement about the AI field, as
>>exemplified e.g. in the Boden anthology, "The Philosophy of Artificial
>>Intelligence", which starts out from an unconvincing and fallacious
>>argument replete with hidden premisses (_the brain_ *can* be imputed
>>with computational properties, therefore _the mind_ *must* be 
>>computational in its nature, implicitly assuming that man is a finite 
>>being in every relevant aspect), --

CM:
>Since it is possible to generate an infinite number of sentences from
>the 26 letters of the alphabet perhaps you can make explicit this
>implicit assumption (that man is finite in every relevant aspect) which
>you impute to Boden? She would not of course have used the phrase
>"imputed with" but I'll allow you that rhetorical licence.  On the face
>of it you seem to have made a silly remark.

Accurate paraphrase is usually considered fair play; furthermore, I meant
not the introduction, but the first paper in the book, written by McCulloch
and Pitts; the finiteness assumption is already implicit in the quaint
title, "A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity", so
feel free to figure it out on your own.  Note the historical importance of
this paper for the "strong AI" program, and pay attention to the explicit
identification of "computability by an organism" with Turing computability
on page 37, which can only be made by an ignoramus or a charlatan.

MZ:
>> -- includes but one genuine objection to the program
>>(Searle's "Chinese Room" argument), --

CM:
>In her own paper Boden considers only two objections, the well-known
>"Robot Reply", and a novel one based on the fact that Searle-in-the-room
>has to understand _something_ -- the programming language he is
>following, because they have something in common she wishes to discuss.
>Since she includes in the previous chapter Searle's summaries and
>replies from his original BBS response-to-peer-criticisms, something
>many other anthologists fail to do, she can hardly be accused of failing
>to include them in her book, nor can Searle be accused of unfairly
>describing them.  Yet you mention her treatment of "but one genuine"
>objection as though she were being ignorant or incomplete. This suggests
>that you either have read this book very carelessly, or are being
>culpably unfair and ad feminam in order to bolster your own position.
                     ^^^^^^^^^^?

Once again, you misunderstand.  The sole genuine objection to the AI
program considered in the book belongs to Searle.  Of course, the fact that
I am not at all impressed either by the predictable Heideggerian cum
Wittgensteinian musings of Dreifus^2, or the half-hearted effort by
Cussins, may say more about my own limitations than about the intrinsic
value of the respective papers; then again, I never purport to represent
anything more authoritative than my personal views.

MZ:
>> -- and curtly dismisses it without
>>inquiring into its implications.

CM:
>Curtly? In my copy of the book she seems to spend at least ten pages
>enquiring into many of its implications. Could it be that you are upset
>because in those ten pages she fails to consider those particular
>implications of which you are especially fond?

Boden reminds me of a drunk looking for lost money under a streetlamp: she
cares not about where she dropped it, but where it would be easier to see.
The implications of Searle's argument are painfully obvious: semantical
knowledge must be represented in, and accessible by, the mind of any
intelligent being.  Pray tell, where are these issues adequately addressed?

CM:
>In sum, you initially accused Dennett of intellectual dishonesty. When
>asked to substantiate this you said you meant not Dennett in particular,
>but the artificial intelligentsia in general. You then substantiate this
>by making specific but apparently unfounded accusations about a book of
>Margaret Boden's.

Note that I specifically wrote "people like Dennett", meaning, quite
clearly, his entire insufferable ilk, whom you call "the artificial
intelligentsia".  As for the book, as indicated above, my references are to
an anthology *edited* by Boden, and not specifically to her own screeds.

CM:
>Unless you can re-interpret your remarks in a more favourable light I
>fear you have once again dug a pit and jumped into it, but this time all
>by yourself.

If you wish to discuss the substantive issue suggested above, rest assured
that I will address your comments with all due consideration; otherwise
feel free to have the last word.

>-- 
>Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
>Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
>5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205


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