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Article 1423 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM (Richard Carlson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Is semiotics an "informal logic"?
Message-ID: <36XNBB3w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM>
Date: 19 Nov 91 14:30:49 GMT
References: <1454@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au>
Lines: 91

jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (John Donald Collier) writes:

> 
>   
> In <1991Nov16.121439.5507@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikh
> 
> >In article <1415@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> 
> >jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (John Donald Collier) writes:
> 
> }}In <BRe6aB2w164w@depsych.Gwinnet 
> }rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM (Richard Carlson) writes:
> 
> }RC:
> }}}Is there such a thing as "formal semantics?"  Where would I find a
> }}}text on this discipline?
> 
> }JDC:
> }}One place to look would be _Formal Philosophy_ by Richard Montague.
> 
> }This is one of the worst places to start, as Montague's papers are
> }well-unreadable even for an expert; moreover, the book is long out of
> }print.
> 
> 
> Well, It depends on what you mena by "expert", I suppose. Some of 
> Stalnaker's writings are much more accessible, but they aren't collected
> in a book that I know of.


I found the Mongtague volume to be such tough going that I
couldn't even grasp the point of view he was emphasizing.

> }Try Dowty, Wall, and Peters' "Introduction to Montague Semantics", or
> }Keenan and Faltz' "Boolean Semantics for Natural Languages", or, more
> }elementary, Martin's "Elements of Formal Semantics".
> 
> Good suggestions, but there are hundreds of books that  deal with
> formal semantics.

There aren't hundreds.  In the Emory University library, books
dealing with "formal semantics" have the same call number as books
in "general semantics" (the Korzybski enterprise) and semantics
generally.  And there aren't many.

> I would question whether situation theory has been "conclusively
> refuted". The problem with much of the formal approach to philosophy
> (which Montague tried to remedy) is that it does not deal with real
> problems. Perry and Barwise use causal structrues to connect to the
> world. The problem with much of the nominalistic Platonism that has
> infected much of Western philosophy is that it can be shown that its
> content is zero.  The main problem is the assumption that any
> distinction is one that we can make. Although my paper "How can I
> conceive being a Brain in a Vat" deals mostly with Putnam, I mention
> the role of this assumption in his argument. The paper is in the
> December 1991 issue of the Australasion Journal of Philosophy.
> 
> The problem with most semantics is that they assume that we can
> determine reference from form alone. Perry and Barwise, through their
> use of causal structures, avoid this problem. The problem is that form
> does not determine content. That can be determine donly by our
> connections to the world. Basically, reference requires a certain
> amount of luck.

This _sounds_ like it is saying that some kind of "code-decode"
procedure for the terms must precede a logical consideration of
the proposition or statement itself.

Frankly the whole enterprise of formal semantics, to the extent
that I understand it, seems wrong. Language is a dialectical
structure, or at least a structure based on binary oppositions of
various kinds at the various levels: phonological, syntactic and
"semantic."  How can ideas from a non-dialectical system --
mathematics and logic seem to be more like "mechanisms" than
"structures" -- be applied without modification to a dialectical
system?  The statements "5 > 2" and "It was hotter yesterday than
it was Saturday" have only a superficial resemblance.  The notion
">" has a precise meaning while the idea of "hotter" is a
comparative built on a binary opposition (hot vs. cold) and
inherently fuzzy.

I may pull a Derrida and not respond to any critique because I
don't think I know enough detail to understand a well-articulated
reformulation.  But just viewing things from a very high level of
abstraction, it _looks_ to me as if "formal semantics" is, as
currently used, almost oxymoronic.

--
Richard Carlson        |    rc@depsych.gwinnett.COM
Midtown Medical Center |    {rutgers,ogicse,gatech}!emory!gwinnett!depsych!rc
Atlanta, Georgia       |
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