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Article 1421 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: davis@passy.ilog.fr (Harley Davis)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Daniel Dennett (was Re: Commenting on the pos
Message-ID: <DAVIS.91Nov19224009@passy.ilog.fr>
Date: 19 Nov 91 21:40:09 GMT
References: <JMC.91Nov17135110@SAIL.Stanford.EDU> <1991Nov17.190935.5546@husc3.harvard.edu>
	<1991Nov18.152531.4246@newcastle.ac.uk>
	<1991Nov18.175322.5587@husc3.harvard.edu>
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In-reply-to: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu's message of 18 Nov 91 22:53:20 GMT


In article <1991Nov18.175322.5587@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

   CH:
   >Symbols are used to refer to these points, and to structures among
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   >them (and for other things); hence denotation.  Structures of symbols
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   >are used to denote these points, and structures among them (and
   >other things); hence expression (a la data base query languages).
   >The only difficulty with finite automata is that they limit the ultimate
   >granularity when concepts are being refined; but since there is only
   >a finite amount of time per person, and most of that is not used in
   >organization, this seldom poses a problem.

   Sorry, this just won't do.  I asked for a theory that would *characterize*
   the relations of expressing and denoting, i.e. in part explain just what it
   takes for a symbol-token to refer to anything at all; this means that you
   can't take the relation of reference as primitive.

   At this point I am not interested in a theory of consciousness.  Give me a
   semantical theory of your choice, and I'll either explain why it can't be
   implemented by a finite-state automaton, or is inadequate for the purpose
   of characterizing the relation of denoting.

What makes you think that real human beings succeed in denoting,
according to your high standards for this esteemed relation?  Surely
you can't just say that *by definition* humans denote, thus
automatically excluding any non-humans from the privileged caste of
denoters a priori?  On the other hand, you don't want to say that we
empirically determine that we denote, because then you must admit that
a computer which passes the Turing Test also denotes.  So what makes
you so sure that denoting is crucial for intelligence?

-- Harley Davis
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