From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo Tue Nov 26 12:30:40 EST 1991
Article 1412 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Is procedural semantics semantics?
Message-ID: <1991Nov19.202909.29614@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 1991 20:29:09 GMT

Does anyone out there know enough about Johnson-Laird's theory of mental
models and enough about semantics -- both philosophical and linguistic --
to help me decide whether Johnson-Laird's adopted theory of semantics,
"procedural semantics", is enough of a semantic theory to do the work
he requires of it?

I'm looking for some real expertise here. I've read most of the relevant
Johnson-Laird articles, as well as Fodor's and others' critiques, so please do
not send me just references. I'm looking to engage someone who is very concerned
with issues of meaning and reasoning in a serious discussion of this issue. 
I'm inclined to think that procedural semantics does NOT do the trick -- that
it's a bit of computational slight-of-hand -- but I'm prepared to be convinced
otherwise by someone who can place it in the context of question s that
conventionally occupy semantic theorists.

Thanks for any help you can provide.


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
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