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Article 1330 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@walsh.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Daniel Dennett (was Re: Commenting on the posting
Message-ID: <1991Nov15.160741.5495@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 15 Nov 91 21:07:40 GMT
References: <5639@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1991Nov14.223348.4076@milton.u.washington.edu> <1991Nov15.003438.11323@grebyn.com>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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Nntp-Posting-Host: walsh.harvard.edu

In article <1991Nov15.003438.11323@grebyn.com> 
fi@grebyn.com (Fiona Oceanstar) writes:

>I asked Mikhail Zeleny to elaborate on his labeling of Dennett "a
>charlatan," but he wrote me back that he will only do so if I make
>it a "public" request.  I puzzled over this one for a couple of
>days, and decided, finally, not to pursue the reasons behind his need
>for me to go public.  Instead I will just comply, and ask again:
>What did you mean, Mikhail?  I read enough mind-brain books, that
>I'd like to hear other people's guidelines for telling the wheat
>from the chaff.

My guideline is very simple: if you see someone offer a reductive argument
purporting to explain the properties of mind, such as consciousness,
cognition, and intentionality, in terms of the alleged computational
properties of the brain, you may conclude that he is a charlatan or an
ignoramus.  This conclusion might be justified historically, by observing
the earlier attempts to explain the functioning of human mind by reference
to the capabilities of the dominant contemporary technology (e.g. clockwork
mechanisms, chemistry, steam engines, etc.), or its behaviorally manifested
properties -- by reference to observable physical properties of human
organs (remember phrenology?).  If the brain can be seen as the seat of
consciousness, why not the liver or the kidneys?  Moreover, there also
exist sound theoretical reasons for rejecting any theory that purports to
reduce human intelligence to the rank of properties of Turing machines.
For those unconvinced by the arguments of Penrose, I have a challenge of my
own making: develop an adequate semantical theory that would characterize
the relevant relations of expressing and denoting, and could be implemented
by a finite state automaton.  So far, John McCarthy has failed to come up
with an answer; anyone who feels that he can do better, is hereby invited
to try.

'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
: 872 Massachusetts Ave., Apt. 707                                   :
: Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139                                     :
: (617) 661-8151                                                     :
: email zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu or zeleny@HUMA1.BITNET            :
:                                                                    :
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`
`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'


