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Article 1300 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: map@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: MIND, BRAIN, CONCIOUSNESS
Message-ID: <37922@shamash.cdc.com>
Date: 13 Nov 91 19:22:26 GMT
Article-I.D.: shamash.37922
References: <1991Oct29.214816.23349@timessqr.gc.cuny.edu> <37577@shamash.cdc.com> <1991Nov11.182221.10967@sun!kla>
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In <1991Nov11.182221.10967@sun!kla> kla!zardoz@sun.com (Phillip Wayne) writes:

>In article <37577@shamash.cdc.com> map@svl.cdc.com writes:
>>
>>This Zen master said that "brain happens to consciousness," which
>>implies that consciousness came first, then the brain.  The proper
>>view is that both mind and consciousness arise from the nature of
>>the brain (and of the rest of the nervous system).
>>

>This view, to be restated, is "I know what mind is; I know what consciousness
>is; I know that they are only chemical reactions"

>Mark is perfectly entitled to whatever view he holds. However, to then say:

>>The concept of consciousness as such can't be defined (except

>seems to imply that he doesn't know what consciousness is. Consciousness is
>a buzzword. If you can't define it, that's ok. But don't try to prove any-
>thing about what you can't define. That's religion, not science.

>Unless this is the "I don't know what it is, but I know it when I see it"
>school of thought.

Consciousness can't be defined because it is an irreducible, self-evident,
primary fact that is implicit in all arguments, all knowledge, and in
particular, all definitions.  

In a formal definition, one essentially reduces the concept being defined
to the less abstract concepts that gave rise to it.  If you don't
understand these less abstract concepts, then you have to find *their*
definitions, and so on, until you reach the point where you understand
all the concepts involved.  Regardless of one's knowledge, however, every
concept has to rest ultimately on irreducible primaries that can't be
formally defined, otherwise an infinite regression results, making
formation of the concept impossible from the outset.  The point is, 
conceptualization has to start *somewhere*, and the only place it has to 
start is with reality, i.e., what we can observe via sense-perception - 
"consciousness" is one such fundamental starting point.

Nobody can "prove" consciousness exists, because proof is a process of
reducing an abstraction to the facts of reality that gave rise to it,
and consciousness is the means by which those facts were grasped in
the first place.  Consciousness is one of the preconditions of proof,
and therefore not subject to proof itself.  But this doesn't mean that
one can't know what consciousness is - we know what it is by observation.
This also doesn't mean that one can't try to prove things that depend on
consciousness - we use consciousness in the attempt, but there is no 
alternative to this.

Proving things about attributes or aspects of consciousness in the absence 
of a formal definition of consciousness is not only NOT "religion," it
is an inescapable part of the scientific method.
--
Mark A. Peters                              ****** ======================
Control Data Corporation                    ****** == "What a save!!!" ==
Internet: map@svl.cdc.com                   ****** == "What an idea!!" ==


