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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Meaning and Agency
Message-ID: <1991Dec13.164821.6536@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 13 Dec 91 21:48:17 GMT
References: <1991Dec9.091317.2145@milton.u.washington.edu> 
 <1991Dec10.013916.6386@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Dec11.042430.13871@milton.u.washington.edu>
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In article <1991Dec11.042430.13871@milton.u.washington.edu> 
forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:

>I hope I haven't cut the thread too deep.  Many lines have been removed.

My own preference is to cite in extenso; feel free to do as you will.

>In article <1991Dec10.013916.6386@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1991Dec9.091317.2145@milton.u.washington.edu> 
>>forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:

GF:
>>>>>I'm not sure I want to consider the semantic role of volition.

MZ:
>>>>Semantics without agency
>>>>is simply inconceivable.

GF:
>>>Not only can I conceive of semantics without agency but I have done so.  What
>>>I have conceived may be malformed but it has matured to such an extent that
>>>it has offspring of its own.

MZ:
>>Let's go back a bit.  When you ask yourself the eternal question, "Why does
>>it hurt when I pee?", do you, in concluding that your symptoms mean that
>>you have a case of clap, conclude also that the gonococcus is a symbol
>>thereof?

GF:
>I would conclude the gonococcus is the cause thereof.  The pain is a signal 
>indicating the onslaught of some pesky critters.  I'm not sure I see your
>point.  Since you reference it later I will delay.

Fine: we have estabilished a causal relation between the gonococcus and the
pain.  Let us also agree that the primitive critter is an automaton wholly
bereft of conscious intentional agency.  Schopenhauer would disagree, but
let's agree to ignore him for the time being.

MZ:
>>you can have a formal semantic theory of the ontological
>>kind, e.g. Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation, of Montague grammar,
>>without a prior theory of action.  On the other hand, once you pose the
>>question of the linguistic meaning, such a theory becomes necessary.  This
>>follows from elementary consideration of the traditional communication
>>scheme: an addressor must be an agent, just as an addressee must be a
>>patient.  Otherwise, we are back to the wily gonococcus.

GF:
>It appears I've played footloose and fancy free with the term "communicate"
>or "agency" becuase I talk of one program module "communicating" with another.
>I don't consider these modules to have volition.

So it seems.  You are welcome to the software notion, but let's not
conflate it with the philosophical one.

GF:
>OK, we are back to the gonococci.  Now while I sometimes think my penis has
>a mind of its own I doubt this is the case.  None the less, it seems to be
>able to communicate the gonococci's arrival just fine.

Once again, the "communication" in question is, in effect, nothing but your
interpretation of natural events that stand for something els only in
virtue of being so treated by you.  The burning sensation is not a symbol
representing the clap, it's a symptom, and hence an integral part thereof.
The gonococcus is not a symbol of the clap, it is the clap.  No semantic
relation exists between the terms.

GF:
>>>I have always assumed that the semantics of a symbol exist independent of
>>>the agent using it (I'm not sure I'm using agency in the way you mean it.) 

MZ:
>>I have argued that your assumption is wrong.  If you find my argument
>>obscure or unconvincing, you should see H.P.Grice's discussion of the
>>difference between natural and non-natural meaning in his classic paper
>>"Meaning", reprinted in his "Studies in the Way of Words".

GF:
>Willco, although this might create a delay too large for my limitted
>attention span.

To summarize, recasting Grice into a Platonist mold, non-natural, or
semantic meaning has the following properties:

(1) Saying that an agent A meant p by s is equivalent to saying that A
intended the utterance of s to produce a specifiable effect with the
propositional content p in his audience by means of their recognition of
his intention in the context of s.  The propositional content p can be
uniquely associated with the equivalence class of sentence-tokens
synonymous with s in the contexts of their utterance, as determined by the
semantic conventions of the language employed by A.  Note that p is not
necessarily open to the awareness of A; in other words, A doesn't
necessarily know what he means by s, as opposed to what he intends it to
convey.  He must nevertheless commit himself to the objective meaning of
his utterance, which transcends his subjective intention, and can only be
determined culturally and contextually.

(2) Saying that s meant p is equivalent to saying that there exists an
intentional causal relation between the occurrence of s and an agent's
prior meaning p by a type-identical utterance s' meaning p.

(3) Saying that s means p is equivalent to saying that the occurrence of s
can be causally associated with a type-identical possible utterance of s'
by an assumed agent meaning p.

GF:
>>>It turns out my teleology doesn't involve "agency" (as I think you define
>>>it) at all.  All my uncaused causes are random.   Am I using "denote" and
>>>"symbol" incorrectly when within my world view I think of a symbol as an
>>>entity which denotes another entity?

MZ:
>>I've always understood Aristotle's discussion of *telos*, or final cause,
>>in the Metaphysics (e.g. Book \Delta 2, 1013b) as depending on agency;
>>perhaps you could persuade me that one could meaningfully talk of the end
>>of a thing, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is, without thereby
>>presupposing noetic and/or somatic agency.  How can an entity use anything
>>without being an agent, and the thing used, a patient?

GF:
>I knew there was a reason I was going to call the gonococci agents; I read it
>right here.  You must mean that the gonococcus is a somatic agent.  But the
>gonococci don't communicate anything (except diseases but that is a different
>story.)  Yet there must be a mixture of the two becuase my penis does seem 
>to communicate with me and it's not a noetic agent.

Somatic agency is sufficient for volition, but not for intention, so the
communication effected by the actions of the bacterium *Neisseria
gonorrhoeae*, such as it is, is bereft of non-natural, semantic meaning.
Aside from certain difficulties involved in individuating bodies, it is on
par with the communication effected by your program modules.

GF:
>I see I am wrong.  Though not involving volition there is agency as you 
>define it.

Right, but observe the above distinction.

GF:
>[For any language used by a philosopher there are a finite number of 
> utterances and within these utterances a finite number of symbols.
> The meaning of these symbols are communicated syntatically.  There exists
> other languages for which these same symbols uttered in the same order
> are syntactically correct.  Up to this point I have considered your
> language to be somewhat different from what I now consider it.]

On the contrary, Chomsky will be happy to tell you that for any language
used by a philosopher there is an infinite number of possible utterances,
each containing a finite number of symbols.  Furthermore, I believe the
meaning to be communicated pragmatically as well as syntactically.

>>GF:
>>>Thanks for your time.

>--gary forbis@u.washington.edu

Regards,
mz

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