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Article 2106 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott)
Subject: Re: Searle and the Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1991Dec13.202505.27715@cs.yale.edu>
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References: <1991Dec8.192843.6951@psych.toronto.edu> <1991Dec11.170157.27053@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec11.203452.9419@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1991 20:25:05 GMT
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  In article <1991Dec11.203452.9419@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
  >
  >In article <1991Dec11.170157.27053@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
  >
  >>The bottom line is that semantics is epiphenomenal, although useful in
  >>explaining why certain syntactic systems maneuver through a world of
  >>zebras so well.  It does not matter that syntax =/= semantics, because
  >>semantics plays no role in our use of internal symbol systems.
  >
  >*SEMANTICS IS EPIPHENOMINAL????!!!!!!!*

YES!!!!!

  >I find it nearly impossible to believe that *you* believe this.  Is 
  >understanding merely "epiphenominal"?

No, understanding is unintelligible.  Or, to be less aphoristic, if
you construe "understanding" as a faculty that plays a role in
thought, then I doubt such a thing exists.  If you mean, Do people
really understand? then the answer is, Yes they really do.

  >Even if you *do* believe that semantics plays *no causal role* in
  >cognition (a position which, I must admit, goes against *my* intuitions)
  >then you *still* need to account for why we *believe* we have semantics and
  >understanding.  I believe that there is no way to do this *without*
  >granting semantics causal efficacy, and hence undermining your assertion.

Let's put understanding aside and get back to semantics.  I will
accept your statement that "we believe we have semantics," and
construe it to mean "we believe our words and thoughts mean
something."  My claim is that this belief is no different from a
belief that (e.g.) ice melts in the summer.  From the computationalist
point of view, each such belief system corresponds to some kind of
internal representation, whose functioning can be explained purely by
reference to the syntax of the elements manipulated.

That's answering "how"; to answer "why" is harder, but I think that
beliefs about the meanings of our thoughts and words play a role as
explaining ourselves to ourselves.  It's like asking why we believe we
have free will.  If we didn't have beliefs about such matters, we'd
have strange gaps in our understanding of the world.  It's better to
have half-baked theories than no theories at all.

  >>Sorry to go on at such length, but I think it's important to clarify
  >>what the disagreement is.

It looks like I crystallized the disagreement out pretty well.  I was
expecting more protests from the AI side, but I'm happy to see that so
many of my colleagues understand the ineffable epiphenomenality of
semantics. 

                                             -- Drew McDermott



