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Article 2078 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle and the Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1991Dec12.193845.27833@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 12 Dec 91 19:38:45 GMT
References: <1991Dec5.191043.10565@psych.toronto.edu> <1991Dec5.220612.27855@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1991Dec8.193847.7238@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 25

In article <1991Dec8.193847.7238@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>The analogy does not hold, as it greatly depends on what *material* I use
>to implement a recipe, whereas functionalism asserts that the actual
>substance used to implement a mind doesn't matter.  Indeed, the above
>analogy seems to fall more in line with Searle's assertion that minds
>are biological properties of brains (whatever *that* might mean).  
>Recipes are indeed completely syntactic, and despite the fact that you
>might have the same formal arrangement with motor oil and iron filings
>as you do with water and flour, the former won't make a cake.
>Likewise, having the same *formal* properties of the biological stuff
>of the brain, Searle might argue, is insuffient *in itself* 
>for understanding.  The "stuff" one uses to implement the syntax 
>matters for Searle.

Multiple realizability is irrelevant here.  The point is that the argument
I presented is formally identical to Searle's (or close enough), that
the premises seem to be true, and that the conclusion is obviously
false.  The natural conclusion is that something is wrong with Searle's
formal argument.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


