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Article 2061 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: From neurons to computation: how?
Message-ID: <60022@netnews.upenn.edu>
Date: 12 Dec 91 15:55:13 GMT
References: <40375@dime.cs.umass.edu> <12636@pitt.UUCP> <59809@netnews.upenn.edu> <12665@pitt.UUCP>
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Reply-To: weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
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In-reply-to: geb@dsl.pitt.edu (gordon e. banks)

In article <12665@pitt.UUCP>, geb@dsl (gordon e. banks) writes:
>>You haven't come close to the >> form of your claim above.  A good
>>deal of brain function can be characterized through neurons.  Much
>>remains a baffling mystery.

>Could you be more specific regarding which functions you feel are
>not capable of being explained by neurons interacting?

I have no such claims one way or the other.  That's basically my point.

But let's make a claim anyway: consciousness is not just the result
of some connectionist style paradigm of neurons wired up.

Is that specific enough?  Note that consciousness can be lost, with
little else affected, by chemical means.

Note that your current statement is less strong (or more ambiguous)
than your previous one--where you cited generic textbooks as defence
of Stanley Friesen's claim that neurons and their connections are
"characterizable processing elements."

>>I posted an article on an experimentally testable proposal of
>>Marshall that uses Froehlich's pumped phonon Bose-Einstein
>>condensation idea based on quantizing cellular dipole vibrations as
>>a basis for consciousness.

>I didn't see your posting, so can't comment on it.  

OK.  But know that brain research is not just so much neuronal reverse
engineering from here on.  There are indeed numerous possibilities in
the air, and quite possibly some total surprises.

>>>>>>>I must conclude that however our brain may achieve meaning,
>>>>>>>it is computable.

>This isn't my quote.

I apologize.  It was from Stanley Friesen.

>		       I don't know that this is true, but I have
>yet to see any theoretical objection to the argument that the brain
>is a machine, and thus capable of being replicated artificially with
>sufficient technology.

Machine yes.  Even Searle agrees that it's a machine.

But what kind of a machine?  A standard AI claim is that a Turing
machine suffices.  Is that what you mean?
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu)


