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Article 2058 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: From neurons to computation: how?
Message-ID: <310@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: 11 Dec 91 23:51:45 GMT
References: <40332@dime.cs.umass.edu> <12616@pitt.UUCP> <40375@dime.cs.umass.edu> <12636@pitt.UUCP> <59809@netnews.upenn.edu>
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine
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In article <59809@netnews.upenn.edu> weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener) writes:
|In article <12636@pitt.UUCP>, geb@dsl (gordon e. banks) writes:
|>The processing elements are the neurons and groups of neurons.  [...]
|
|You haven't come close to the >> form of your claim above.  A good
|deal of brain function can be characterized through neurons.  Much
|remains a baffling mystery.

I would not say 'baffling', I would say 'bewildering'.

We may not have every detail nailed down, but every month brings us closer,
and so far those working in neurology have found no significant barriers or
discrepencies other then the sheer overwhelming *complexity* of a mammalian
brain.

So, until the neurologists find a problem with the model of mind as the
emergent product of neural data processing, I will apply KISS and assume
that this model is correct, or at least a useful aproximation.

|>      Of course it is impossible to prove that there isn't some
|>other overlooked factor, such as a spirit or animus, from which
|>the true consciousness arises.
|
|Since it hasn't been proven that it arises from neurons, either, what
|is your point?

That by KISS (or Occam's Razor) one selects the simplest theory until proven
wrong.  Right now that is that the human mind is an emergent property of
the data processing operations of the brain.

|who ask embarrassing questions, like, "where's the evidence?"  I posted
|an article on an experimentally testable proposal of Marshall that uses
|Froehlich's pumped phonon Bose-Einstein condensation idea based on
|quantizing cellular dipole vibrations as a basis for consciousness.

Fine, and when someone does this experiment, *and* it shows a *psychologically*
relevant effect as far as the human mind is concerned, I will keep to the
simpler theory.

[I do not have either the money nor the equipment to do such an experiment].

|>  Obviously, we have not the current
|>technology to do this with humans yet, but we haven't found any data
|>inconsistent with the neuron theory.  Have you?
|
|So what do you think of nitric oxide signalling?  Pumped phonon Bose
|Einstein condensation?  These are two fun questions that can keep
|researchers busy for years.

Actually, I seem to have missed the article where you described this.
[We are having disk space problems and are dropping articles here].

So, enlighten me.  What relevance do these have to human psychology?
What evidence is there that the brain makes use of Bose-Einstein condensation
in its normal operation?

Just because there is a mathematical model of something does not make it
relevant.  There must be observational evidence that the model applies.
|
|And you wrote earlier, based on all these processing elements:
|
|>>>>>I must conclude that however our brain may achieve meaning,
|>>>>>it is computable.
|
|This is an incredibly big leap.  Computable in what sense?  Turing?
|Edelman, for example, concludes at the end of THE REMEMBERED PRESENT
|that his model is, in the final analysis, not Turing computable,
|because the external world is too variable.
|
|You can believe what you like.  But conclude?  Tell us how, please.

Actually, I believe *I* am the one who made the above statement.

And I mean computable in the sense that physical computers as we build them
today could compute the same data transform as any given neuron (including
the temporal variability we calling learning).

I conclude it because all that I know about the operation of neurons (and
that is considerable, since I am by background a biologist) is fully
consistant with the theory that it is only the signalling properties
of a neuron that are relevant to thought.  That is the smallest relevant
operation is the synaptic firing - involving *millions* of molecules,
not the handful necessary for quantum effects to matter.  In fact there
is even reason to doubt that the *individual* synaptic junction is of
much significance, but that it is rather *clusters* of synapses, and clusters
of firings that constitute the operational unit of the neuron, if so then
variations in the response of a single synapse will not change anything unless
it is correlated with matching differences in associated synapses. [Roughly,
neural signals are *frequency* encoded, and connection weighting is
accomplished by changing the *number* of synapses].

In order to challenge this conclusion you must show behaviorally or
informationally relevant effects that are not derived from this type
of operation.  As far as I know, no such effect has ever been found.
And our model of the basic signalling properties of neurons has not
changed significantly for a number of years.  (Event the current discussion
of the possible role of glial cells in learning [?backpropagation?] does
not really challenge the basic model).
-- 
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uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)



