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Article 1993 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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cke
>From: mcke@unixg.ubc.ca (William McKellin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle, again
Message-ID: <1991Dec9.214656.4803@unixg.ubc.ca>
Date: 9 Dec 91 21:46:56 GMT
References: <2151@ucl-cs.uucp>
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In article <2151@ucl-cs.uucp> G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) writes:
>In article <odCwNqy00WBKI3V7gH@andrew.cmu.edu> fb0m+@andrew.cmu.edu (Franklin Boyle) writes:
>>> Gordon Joly writes (in response to my statement about "understanding"
>>> not being in the rule book):
>>> 
>>> > No, the understanding is in both the Book of Instruction and the
>>> > Heads of the People who Wrote the Book of Instruction.
>>> 
>>> In what sense are the symbols and rules in the book like "mental
>>> objects" (or states if you like) in the head? 
>>> 
>>> -Frank
>
>If not in "the head", then where are they?
>
>
>____
>
>Gordon Joly                                       +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716
>Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk          UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
>Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT
>
>  he said what? - he said "hello" -- that's a bit aggressive isn't it?

     Has anyone ever asked why Searle's box is Chinese?  I
believe that Searle obscures the argument by suggesting that he
is dealing with a system that is foreign to his audience and that
his example has universal applicability. 
     I worked among the Managalase in Papua New Guinea, who
believed that certain birds are the spirits of their dead
relatives. They know that the birds are not their relatives in a
physical sense but they are able to carry on conversations with
these kin. Similarly, I have seen people in North America talk to
computers (and other electronic devices) and use expert systems.
While acknowledging that these machines are not human they
responded to them as if they had understanding and intelligence -
just like the Managalase birds- though they are far from the
kinds of AI systems which Searle is attacking. 
     How is the attribution process towards birds and machines
different from each individual's attribution of understanding,
interpretation, intelligence and personhood to other humans?  
     Searle plays on our culture's commonsense, notions and
frameworks of belief surrounding "agency", "animate" and
"inanimate" , "understanding" and "interpretation". The neural
wetware of Managalase birds (to say nothing of chimps and other
animals we personify) have characteristics much closer to
the human brain than the computers and programs which Searle has
criticized. Yet, though the Managalase treat these birds as
intelligent. I doubt that this would be possible in Searle's
world.ds


