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Article 1963 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Zeleny (was Re: Searle
Message-ID: <1991Dec8.180409.6324@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 8 Dec 91 23:04:08 GMT
References: <12538@pitt.UUCP> <1991Dec2.110629.6077@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Dec3.181458.18420@cherokee.uswest.com>
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In article <1991Dec3.181458.18420@cherokee.uswest.com> 
ken@dakota (Kenny Chaffin) writes:

>In article <1991Dec2.110629.6077@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <12538@pitt.UUCP> 
>>geb@dsl.pitt.edu (gordon e. banks) writes:

>>>In article <1991Dec1.113406.6027@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>>>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

GB:
>>>>>There have been some connectionist programs (such as Sejnowski's)
>>>>>that have learned to speak words.  These symbols were learned
>>>>>by reinforcing certain stimuli, so I suppose you could say they
>>>>>"refer" to the stimulus in some way.  In a more complex computer,
>>>>>such as the brain, the referents would be multiple and complex.

MZ:
>>>>I would argue that the program's words merely refer to its internal
>>>>representation (under our interpretation, of course) of the stimulus, as,
>>>>regardless of how such a representation occurred, the program's response
>>>>would be the same.

GB:
>>>And how would that contrast with our words refering to our internal
>>>representation of the objects and abstractions that we are symbolizing
>>>by them?

MZ:
>>Unlike internal representations like sense-data, abstract objects like
>>propositions, expressed by our words, or numbers, denoted by them, can be
>>meaningfully used in communication with those not enjoying privileged
>>access to our mental processes.

KAC:
>	Right, but that is only a level of abstraction, a method of 
>communicating, and a shared semantics. It has no bearing on the fact that
>symbols either represent something or not.

Symbolic representation presupposes semantics.

>KAC

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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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