From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Mon Dec  9 10:48:57 EST 1991
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Searle and the Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1991Dec8.192843.6951@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <YAMAUCHI.91Dec5040116@heron.cs.rochester.edu> <1991Dec5.191043.10565@psych.toronto.edu> <1991Dec5.210724.12480@cs.yale.edu>
Date: Sun, 8 Dec 1991 19:28:43 GMT

In article <1991Dec5.210724.12480@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
>
>   In article <1991Dec5.191043.10565@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>   >While all of the discussion here around the Chinese Room example has been
>   >at times inventive, it seems to me that the anti-Searle forces for the
>   >most part miss the distinction that can be drawn between Searle's
>   >*logical argument*, namely, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and
>   >his *demonstration*, or *thought experiment*, namely, the Chinese Room.
>
>Searle has two arguments, the original Chinese Room argument, and the
>Scientific American argument, with "Axioms" and "Conclusions."  I
>think he finally realized just how silly the first one was, and came
>up with the second to compensate.  

My reading of the Scientific American article is that the "Axioms" and  
"Conclusions" is simply an explicit and extended formal presentation of
the simple argument outlined above.  I do not at all see how it differs
greatly from the "original" argument, nor do I believe that Searle thinks
the argument is silly.

>
>   >The strength of Searle's arugment is that, contrary to what some may claim,
>   >it does not rest on any particular way of telling the Chinese Room story.  The
>   >argument simply is that it is impossible to generate semantics from a purely
>   >syntactic system.  This, Searle argues, is a *logical* point, true simply in
>   >virtue of what the words "syntax" and "semantics" mean.  
>
>It's a logical point, maybe even a terminological point, and hence
>entirely independent of the Chinese Room argument, as I'm sure Searle
>is aware.

Once again, the Chinese Room *demonstration* is *NOT* the argument,
at least as I understand it.  (How can an *example* be an *argument?)
The Chinese Room merely attempts to demonstrate the truth that 
syntax (symbol manipulation) is not sufficient for semantics, by having
a person imagine doing purely syntactic symbol manipulation.


>  Unfortunately, it settles nothing.  Suppose we agree that
>syntax =/= semantics.  Then those who believe in "strong AI" believe
>that the semantic abilities of people do not transcend those of
>computers equipped with similar sensors, effectors, and reasoners. 

OK, although this is a "belief", and not an argument.

>  To
>the degree that they grant that the computer cannot bootstrap itself
>into being able to refer to objects, they also believe that people
>cannot do it.

Again, this is an article of faith necessary for the strong AI program
to proceed, but what you have presented here is not an argument.

>  Of course, they believe that people can do something
>like "use the same symbol in the presence of the same object most of
>the time," and that this is the closest any system can get to being
>able to "refer" to objects, notwithstanding our introspective
>certainty that (Axiom 2) "our minds have mental contents (semantics)"
>and we possess "knowledge of what [our symbols] mean" (to quote from
>Searle's Scientific American article).

But certainly these last points are not trivial.  While I may only have
behaviour to go on for *your* understanding, I *know* what understanding
means *to me*, and I *know* that when I use symbols that they refer to
something.  Searle's point of the Chinese Room example is to show that
while you may know what an English symbol refers to, you do *not* know
what a Chinese symbol refers to, despite the fact that the behaviour is
the same, that the symbols are used appropriately in both cases.

- michael
 



