From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!tdatirv!sarima Mon Dec  9 10:48:25 EST 1991
Article 1902 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!tdatirv!sarima
>From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle (was .....)
Message-ID: <299@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: 5 Dec 91 19:53:59 GMT
References: <EdBeY9i00WBME1JoNV@andrew.cmu.edu> <292@tdatirv.UUCP> <12552@pitt.UUCP>
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine
Lines: 17

In article <12552@pitt.UUCP> geb@dsl.pitt.edu (gordon e. banks) writes:
|I think the hypothesis (if that is what you intended) that mental
|models of the world are necessary for memories is faulty.  Animals
|certainly have memories, but I doubt if they have mental models
|of the world (at least not lower animals).

If that is what I meant, that would indeed be wrong.  I meant that we have
no *consciously* *accessable* memories of our pre-concept stage.  Certainly
infants have memory in the raw biological sense of the word, that is how they
*learn* such things as concepts and mental models.

But these early 'memories' exist purely as response patterns, feelings,
and other 'subconscious' influences.  They are not *organized* into
an accessible format.
-- 
---------------
uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)


