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Article 2454 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ignore Searle and be happier
Message-ID: <61218@netnews.upenn.edu>
Date: 31 Dec 91 00:38:16 GMT
References: <1991Dec30.193339.28438@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1991Dec30.194943.25819@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1991Dec30.203517.30168@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1991Dec30.205545.875@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
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Reply-To: weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
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In-reply-to: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)

In article <1991Dec30.205545.875@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>, chalmers@bronze (David Chalmers) writes:
>The point is that if one accepts that fading states of consciousness with
>fixed functional organization is unreasonable,

And this seems to be assuming your conclusion.  That is, if consciousness
depended on something like pumped phonon condensates, and so the silicon
duplicates missed this aspect of neuron duplication, then at one end of the
continuum you'd have the N->oo limit with phase transition, at the other
end you'd have a robot with incredible instincts (and, say, an excellent
sense of smell) and yes, there would be a continuum of consciousness states
in between.

Perhaps some of those states exist and have been observed but not identified
as such.  Take a look at a catalogue of brain disorders--Binswanger, William,
Down, Parkinson, Korsakoff, Huntington, schizophrenia, multiple personality,
chronic depression, glioblastoma, etc--the list is endless.  Most of them do
have a known physiological or at least some kind of functional explanation,
yet I can't help but wonder just what the state of mind is like here.

Consider, for example, Korsakoff's syndrome, which involves the "tiniest" of
losses: the ability to turn short-term memories into permanent memories.  The
entire brain, but for a lesion in the hippocampus, remains as before.  Yet
the mind seems to be lost in a permanent fog of the present.  Could this be
considered as a faded state of consciousness?  How would anyone know?
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu)


