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Article 2326 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: markc@smsc.sony.com (Mark Corscadden)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: red light / blue light scenario
Message-ID: <1991Dec20.202630.14526@smsc.sony.com>
Date: 20 Dec 91 20:26:30 GMT
References: <1991Dec20.004238.11206@smsc.sony.com> <1991Dec19.222126.2296@arizona.edu>
Organization: Sony Microsystems Corp, San Jose, CA
Lines: 66

In article <1991Dec19.222126.2296@arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>
>Mark Corscadden:
>>  Red Light / Blue Light Scenario
>>  (
>>  ...
>
>First a reference:  the essay "Where was I?" by Dennett in "The
>Mind's I" (edited by Dennett & Hofstadter) does a great job of
>clarifying the issues raised here.

Yet another item for my library shopping list.  Okay, will check it out.


>Now a response:  
>
>There is no good answer to the question, because in the situation
>described, the word "you" does not have a consistent meaning.
> [ I asked a question using the word "you".  Mr. Skaggs gives
>   a good description of the fundamental semantic ambiguity
>   with my use of the word "you" in this scenario. ]
>	-- Bill

Please take a look at the following modified version of my original
scenario, which I believe avoids those fundamental semantic problems
concerning my use of the word "you".

Preliminary to giving the modified scenario, I have to admit that
I'm a reasonably selfish person in the following sense.  Given some
Very Nice Thing (such as winning a bunch of money) and given the
power to influence whether the Very Nice Thing happens to me or to
another person, I'd make it happen to me.  Alternatively, given a
Very Horrible Thing, I guess I'd make it happen to someone else if
the only alternative was having it happen to me.

Caveat:  If you, Mr. Skaggs, are not selfish in a similar fashion
(no judgement implied) then the following modified scenario probably
won't do anything for you.

  Modified Scenario

  Tomorrow Mr. Skaggs is going to be the subject of an actual
  experiment which may involve creating a duplicate of him.
  Today he is given the proverbial two choices, allowing him
  to determine which of these two experiments will be performed
  tomorrow:

  1)  Tomorrow he'll be duplicated.  The duplicate will have a Very
      Horrible Thing happen to him.  The original Mr. Skaggs will have
      a Very Nice Thing happened to him.

  2)  Tomorrow no duplication will take place.  The one and only
      Mr. Skaggs will face a lottery.  There is a 1 in 10 chance
      that a Very Horrible Thing will happen to him, and a 9 in 10
      chance that a Very Nice Thing will happen to him.

  I really hate to put you through this; I hope you understand that
  it's all in the name of philosophical investigation :-)

Tomorrow semantic problems with the word "you" will abound, but today
there is one and only one Mr. Skaggs, and that's *you*, Mr. Skaggs.
So I'm asking *you*, today, what choice will you make today, and why?

Mark Corscadden
markc@smsc.sony.com
work: (408)944-4086


