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Article 2311 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: orourke@unix1.cs.umass.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle's response to silicon brain?
Message-ID: <40977@dime.cs.umass.edu>
Date: 20 Dec 91 16:57:14 GMT
References: <40822@dime.cs.umass.edu> <40825@dime.cs.umass.edu> <40832@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1991Dec18.130655.6745@husc3.harvard.edu>
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Reply-To: orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Organization: Smith College, Northampton, MA, US
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I said:
>>[...] I am suggesting a *thought* experiment, so the lack of
>>evidence claimed is only relevant if a digital neuron simulator
>>is impossible *in principle*.

Mikhail Zeleny replied (in <1991Dec18.130655.6745@husc3.harvard.edu>):
>Since your thought experiment is designed to argue for an empirical
>possibility, the burden of arguing for logical possibility falls on you. 

I don't understand this remark.  The form of the Gedanken experiment
is: IF x were possible, THEN would y hold?  Here x involves
accurate simulation of neurons and interfacing them electrically
and chemically with a living human;  y is understanding according
to Searle.  Whether x is logically possible is a separate issue.
	Certainly, if x is not logically possible, then the
experiment proves nothing.  But I don't see any evident *logical*
impossibility to x, so I see no harm in imagining that it is
possible. 


