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>From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Virtual Person? (was re: Searle and the Chine
Keywords: personal identity
Message-ID: <1991Dec16.163345.6653@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 16 Dec 91 21:33:42 GMT
References: <1991Dec13.204324.27948@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec15.023122.6582@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Dec16.181202.526@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1991Dec16.181202.526@cs.yale.edu> 
mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>In article <1991Dec15.023122.6582@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1991Dec13.204324.27948@cs.yale.edu> 
>>mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>>>In article <1991Dec11.203452.9419@psych.toronto.edu> 
>>>michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

MG:
>>>>And what the heck do you *mean* by "virtual person"?
>>>>And why can't *I*, by performing the appropriate operations, instantiate
>>>>one myself?

DMD:
>>>Suppose that Searle's
>>>hypothetical Chinese understander is written.  We run it on a
>>>computer, and have a conversation with what appears to be a
>>>Chinese-speaking person.  ...
>>>What I mean by virtual persons in such a straightforward case is simply
>>>the processes implementing [... the interlocutors ... ]

MZ:
>>Although this is not the first time you take my name in vain, I have so far
>>abstained from addressing your arguments, for the simple reason that I
>>found your mistakes far less amusing or instructive than those made by
>>others.  

DMD:
>[Translation for those new to Zelenyspeak: "I couldn't think of a
>refutation of your argument."]

Not so. You have no argument, just some claims about the nature of
semantics; I have given a refutation of such absurd claims even before you
made them, and will happily send, on request, an AMS-LaTeX format summary
thereof to anyone who happened to miss the discussion on the Putnam thread.

MZ:
>>    In particular, the common misconception that extensional semantic
>>functions (never mind intensional things like belief functioning) can be
>>explained purely by reference to the syntax of the elements manipulated by
>>the program could be remedied by an elementary course in model theory, and
>>won't concern me here.  

DMD:
>Don't forget, I said semantics was epiphenomenal.

Indeed you said semantics was epiphenomenal; fortunately, the
truth-value of this sort of claim depends on your say-so as little as
the truth-value of `2 + 2 = 5'.  Of course, if you truly believe semantics
to be epiphenomenal, you can't claim that your arguments to that effect are
true. 

MZ:
>>   This mistake, as you note yourself, has been made
>>earlier by John McCarthy, who in contradistinction to you seems to be able
>>to appreciate issues of formal logic at least to the extent of avoiding
>>facile blunders of the above sort.  

DMD:
>[Translation: "McCarthy seemed to agree with me at one point."]

I'll make it clear: based on my acquaintance with the published writings,
as well as the net performance of McCarthy and yourself, I believe only one
of you to be making any sense in his pronouncements, or even producing any
scholarship in his work.  Figuring out which one it is is left as an
exercise for the reader.

MZ:
>>Being that I have other responsibilities in addition to doing philosophical
>>propaganda, 

DMD:
>[Translation: "Because I still can't think of a refutation,..."]

I see I'll have to drive the truth home.  A conclusive refutation of your
ludicrous semantic claims was made long before your birth in the work of
L\"owenheim, Skolem, G\"odel, Tarski, and Church.  I have argued along the
realist lines,responding to well-known model-theoretic results of Putnam,
for about two months; I have no interest in reiterating my arguments for
the sole benefit of those afflicted with a reading disability or a
drastically limited attention span.  However, a summary of my position is
available for the consideration of any interested party.

MZ:
>>   I'll limit myself to some brief remarks, referring intersted
>>parties to articles on personsal identity and memory in the "Encyclopedia
>>of Philosophy" and the bibliography contained therein.  In short, personal
>>identity presupposes continuity of memory (this is neither a necessary nor
>>a sufficient condition thereof, but rather the best we can do after two and
>>a half millenia of philosophical inquiry), as well as first-person access
>>thereinto.  Another criterion of personal identity consists in the felt
>>continuity of volition, equally dependent on a first-person view.  In other
>>words, there exists no known way to individuate persons without first
>>granting their personhood, an assumption that would beg the question of
>>artificial intelligence.  

DMD:
>I realize that carrying on several discourses at once can get
>confusing; also, I left too much of my context implicit.  The claim
>that we could generate persons computationally was made in the context
>of Searle's argument.  As you remember, he postulated that AI had, in
>some remote future epoch, succeeded in creating a marvelous program
>that fulfilled the AI dream of creating persons out of computations.
>Of course, Searle doesn't really believe this is possible; he was just
>assuming it in the course of a reductio ad absurdum.  My point was
>that since he was imagining that the feat could be accomplished on a
>computer, he would have to grant that it could be accomplished using
>another person as computational medium.

No, he wouldn't.  Searle is a philosopher, and, unlike yourself, is not
given to throwing around unwarranted claims of personal identity.

MZ:
>>   Moreover, the conative criterion relies on the
>>assumption of free agency, which is often considered untenable by AI
>>theorists.  In other words, you are in no position to posit virtual
>>personhood.

DMD:
>Assumption by whom?  

An assumption of free agency has to be made by anyone taking the
conative criterion of personal identity seriously.  Spinoza is a
conspicuous exception; however I would argue that he fails to give
grounds for any theory of personal identity for that very reason.

DMD:
>                    Considered untenable in what way?  Please clarify.

Given that the criterion in question relies on the felt continuity of
volition, equally dependent on an assumption of free agency, as well as
a first-person view, it is relevant that both of the latter are
rejected by AI theorists like Dennett (in his books "Elbow Room" and
"Consciousness Explained").  The moral of this story is: if you wish to
continue making reference to "virtual persons", you better invent some
radical new criterion of personal identity, and step back to watch it
explode in your face.  More importantly, you might want to start paying
attention to old fogies like Locke, Reid, Spinoza, and so on; they
weren't *all* idiots in the pre-computation age...

>
>                                             -- Drew McDermott


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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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