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>From: mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott)
Subject: Re: Virtual Person? (was re: Searle and the Chinese Room)
Message-ID: <1991Dec16.181202.526@cs.yale.edu>
Keywords: personal identity
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References: <1991Dec11.203452.9419@psych.toronto.edu> <1991Dec13.204324.27948@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec15.023122.6582@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 1991 18:12:02 GMT
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  In article <1991Dec15.023122.6582@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
  >In article <1991Dec13.204324.27948@cs.yale.edu> 
  >mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
  >
    >>In article <1991Dec11.203452.9419@psych.toronto.edu> 
    >>michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
    >
    >
    >MG:
    >>>And what the heck do you *mean* by "virtual person"?
    >>>And why can't *I*, by performing the appropriate operations, instantiate
    >>>one myself?
    >
  >
  >DMD:
  >>Suppose that Searle's
  >>hypothetical Chinese understander is written.  We run it on a
  >>computer, and have a conversation with what appears to be a
  >>Chinese-speaking person.  ...
  >>What I mean by virtual persons in such a straightforward case is simply
  >>the processes implementing [... the interlocutors ... ]
  >
  >Although this is not the first time you take my name in vain, I have so far
  >abstained from addressing your arguments, for the simple reason that I
  >found your mistakes far less amusing or instructive than those made by
  >others.  

[Translation for those new to Zelenyspeak: "I couldn't think of a
refutation of your argument."]

   In particular, the common misconception that extensional semantic
  >functions (never mind intensional things like belief functioning) can be
  >explained purely by reference to the syntax of the elements manipulated by
  >the program could be remedied by an elementary course in model theory, and
  >won't concern me here.  

Don't forget, I said semantics was epiphenomenal.

   This mistake, as you note yourself, has been made
  >earlier by John McCarthy, who in contradistinction to you seems to be able
  >to appreciate issues of formal logic at least to the extent of avoiding
  >facile blunders of the above sort.  

[Translation: "McCarthy seemed to agree with me at one point."]

  >Being that I have other responsibilities in addition to doing philosophical
  >propaganda, 

[Translation: "Because I still can't think of a refutation,..."]

   I'll limit myself to some brief remarks, referring intersted
  >parties to articles on personsal identity and memory in the "Encyclopedia
  >of Philosophy" and the bibliography contained therein.  In short, personal
  >identity presupposes continuity of memory (this is neither a necessary nor
  >a sufficient condition thereof, but rather the best we can do after two and
  >a half millenia of philosophical inquiry), as well as first-person access
  >thereinto.  Another criterion of personal identity consists in the felt
  >continuity of volition, equally dependent on a first-person view.  In other
  >words, there exists no known way to individuate persons without first
  >granting their personhood, an assumption that would beg the question of
  >artificial intelligence.  

I realize that carrying on several discourses at once can get
confusing; also, I left too much of my context implicit.  The claim
that we could generate persons computationally was made in the context
of Searle's argument.  As you remember, he postulated that AI had, in
some remote future epoch, succeeded in creating a marvelous program
that fulfilled the AI dream of creating persons out of computations.
Of course, Searle doesn't really believe this is possible; he was just
assuming it in the course of a reductio ad absurdum.  My point was
that since he was imagining that the feat could be accomplished on a
computer, he would have to grant that it could be accomplished using
another person as computational medium.

   Moreover, the conative criterion relies on the
  >assumption of free agency, which is often considered untenable by AI
  >theorists.  In other words, you are in no position to posit virtual
  >personhood.

Assumption by whom?  Considered untenable in what way?  Please clarify.

                                             -- Drew McDermott






