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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Open Letter to Professor Penrose
Message-ID: <DL8tA6.GHK@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <4bncj5$a94@panix3.panix.com> <4d35f3$ird@ixnews2.ix.netcom.com> <4d6506$l8a@dub-news-svc-5.compuserve.com> <BILL.96Jan12143031@subiculum.nsma.arizona.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 1996 22:03:42 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.physics:165201 sci.logic:16596 comp.ai:35948 comp.ai.philosophy:36651 sci.philosophy.meta:23152

In article <BILL.96Jan12143031@subiculum.nsma.arizona.edu>,
Bill Skaggs <bill@nsma.arizona.edu> wrote:
>101445.237@compuserve.com (Antony Jones) writes:
>
>   > 2.If all actions were predetermined then :
>   >	     Look at it on a global scale, we have a destiny that is
>   >   predetermined yet it has been suggested that by argument one
>   >   can change one's mind. Is this change of mind predetermined?
>   >   If so then there is truly no free will, [ . . . ]
>
>I don't agree with this conclusion.
>
>Consider the following example:  George likes pie, in fact he loves it
>and never passes up a chance to eat it.  George is about to go out for
>a walk, when his mother tells him that if he stays home he can have a
>piece of her fresh-baked pie.  George decides to stay, and anybody who
>knows him could have predicted this decision.  Does this mean that it
>was not an act of free will?  I wouldn't say so.
>
>Predetermination, or even predictability, do not necessarily conflict
>with free will.
>
>Let me pursue this point a bit further.  The idea that determinism
>conflicts with free will is a relic of obsolete metaphysics,
>specifically the notion of the soul.  An action would be said to be
>free if it was determined by the soul, rather than the body or the
>world; this was a reasonable concept because the soul was considered
>to be something separate from the world.  Now that we no longer accept
>the notion of a nonphysical soul, this line of reasoning has no
>validity.  Determination of an action by the self (i.e., free will)
>can no longer be taken to imply lack of determination by the physical
>world. 
>
>	-- Bill

Whereas I agree with your view of relation between determination of actions
by the self and determination of actions by the physical world (as the only
logical conclusion that can be reached if the notion of the soul is 
rejected), I do not think that it reflects views of majority of people using 
the term. As far as I can see the majority have not thought it through
rigorously enough to see that this is the only logical conclusion given
materialist approach. A lot of people still tend to hold to the view that
there is an element which cannot be reduced to laws of physics, even though
they are upset if you call them dualists (they say they do not believe in
soul). There are also some who use physics language to try to reason out
the soul out of matter (quantum back-action and some such). It all basically
comes down to the issue of accepting or not that we are just (even if very
complex) machines, i.e. is there a clear difference between life and 
non-life?.

Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Information Commons                   what they think and not what they see.
pindor@breeze.hprc.utoronto.ca                      Huang Po
