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From: neverett@umassd.edu
Subject: Re: Is time continuous?
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References: <1995Feb20.144659.9334@vax.sbu.ac.uk> <3iikm3INN9j7@duncan.cs.utk.edu> <MXM.95Feb26034944@dcs.ed.ac.uk>,<3iumrp$m8n@btr0x1.hrz.uni-bayreuth.de>
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 1995 22:45:20 GMT
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In article <3iumrp$m8n@btr0x1.hrz.uni-bayreuth.de>, thomas@btm2d1.mat.uni-bayreuth.de (Thomas Wieland) writes:
>In <MXM.95Feb26034944@dcs.ed.ac.uk>, Mike Moran <mxm@dcs.ed.ac.uk> writes:

Excuse me, but the answer to your questions has been dealt with in the 
Critique of Pure Reason and the World as Will and Representation.  The
difference here is the distinction between phenomena as perceived by
the senses (representation) and the thing in itself (will).

Nate Everett





>>	Just as an aside (i'm not sure whether it will effect the
>>force of any subsequent argument): regarding,
>>
>>"...we need to distinguish a physical object and attributes of that
>>object."
>>
>>	Isn't a "physical object" nothing but "the attributes of that
>>object"? I don't want to sound like a pedant trying to start of
>>definition war, but i feel its important to make this point. To me an
>>object is the entirety of all the attributes which i can distinguish
>>about it through my perceptions. By this definition, to "distinguish a
>>physical object and attributes of that object" would leave you with
>>nothing.
>>
>
>You've got the point of distinction which is called ontology and epistomology by
>philosophers (though I don't know if these English expressions are correct).
>The view you stated is the pure epistomological one, since you define any object solely 
>via the attributes you can perceive. But this is just _one_ side of the medal.
>There may be objects which cannot be perceived at all - yet they exists. So
>the ontological existence (the mere being) is just a necessary condition
>for the epistomological existence (it can be perceived), but no sufficient one.
>
>
>Thomas Wieland               +---------------+
>Dipl. Math.                  |+----    +----+|
>Lehrstuhl II f. Mathematik   |\    \   |    ||
>Universitaet Bayreuth        | \    \  |    ||
>                             |  \    \ |    ||
>95440 Bayreuth               |   \    \\    ||
>Germany                      |    \    \\   ||
>Tel. +49 (921) 553386        |     \     \\ ||
>Fax  +49 (921) 553385        |      \-------||
>                             +---------------+
>
>Thomas Wieland               +---------------+
>Dipl. Math.                  |+----    +----+|
>Lehrstuhl II f. Mathematik   |\    \   |    ||
>Universitaet Bayreuth        | \    \  |    ||
>                             |  \    \ |    ||
>95440 Bayreuth               |   \    \\    ||
>Germany                      |    \    \\   ||
>Tel. +49 (921) 553386        |     \     \\ ||
>Fax  +49 (921) 553385        |      \-------||
>                             +---------------+
>
>
