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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Is time continuous?
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Date: Thu, 2 Mar 95 04:44:10 GMT
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In <3j20h3$hqg@curly.cc.utexas.edu> johncobb@uts.cc.utexas.edu (John W. Cobb) writes:
>In article <1995Mar1.004312.4558@galileo.cc.rochester.edu>,
>Greg Stevens <stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu> wrote:
>:>In <3iumrp$m8n@btr0x1.hrz.uni-bayreuth.de> thomas@btm2d1.mat.uni-bayreuth.de (Thomas Wieland) writes:

>:>> [...]
>:>>There may be objects which cannot be perceived at all - yet they exists. So
>:>>the ontological existence (the mere being) is just a necessary condition
>:>>for the epistomological existence (perception), but no sufficient one.

>:>This is a view that has always confused me.  I have a line of reasoning 
>:>which seems to conclude that there can not be objects which are not
>:>perceived at all, and I'm a curious which point in the argument someone
>:>who believes as you do would disagree with:

>:>1) Humans create language
>:>2) Humans create words with a reason
>:>3) Humans create referential nouns to refer to catagories of experience
>:>   (whether catagories which put together specify what we call "physical
>:>   objects" or "phenomena," it is still labels for catagories of experience).

>Stop, I'm getting off here. I have a noun called "unicorn" that has meaning
>and was created with a reason. The word and concept exist, but the unicorn
>itslef does not. My point is that we have language and reason and analogy.
>This allows us to take words and concepts we are familiar with, perhaps even
>from experience, and combine them together to conceive of things never
>experienced. Sometimes they make sense like a unicorn, sometimes they are
>nonsense like the works of Lewis Carroll. However, we have the ability
>to conceive of things which do not have physical existence.

Okay, that's fine.  I did not say that the catagories specifying perceptual
phenomena had to be catagories which were ever perceived together.  You
*will* grant, I believe, that what a unicorn is is defined in terms of
perceptual phenomena -- or can be thus defined (you know, horse-like,
one horn, etc).  Thus, our terms cluster catagories of perception
which are never thus clustered in our experience (i.e. seeing a horse-
like thing with one horn in the middle of its head).

But all this concludes is that all things that there are terms for are not
necessarily things that exist. 

Let: Px = thing x has percpetual characteristics
     Ex = thing x exists
     Tx = there is a term clumping perceptual characteristics and calling 
          them by the name x.
     ~ is "NOT"
     -> is "IMPLIES"
     & is "AND"
     V is "OR"

I claimed: (Ex -> Px)  
      My reasoning was that to SAY with LANGUAGE that "Ex"
      we need to have a term "x", so by necessity
      (Ex -> Tx),
      and because terms are defined by perceptual characteristics
      (including terms like "unicorn"),
      (Tx -> Px), from which my conclusion is valid.

YOU claimed: ~(Ex -> Px)
      Which is the same as saying  ~(  ~Ex V Px )
      Which is the same as saying  ( ~~Ex & ~Px )
      Which is the same as saying  ( Ex & ~Px )
      In other words, it is possible for some x that it exist and
      that it not have perceptual qualities.

Your example, however, did not support your position or refute mine,
because it was of the form: (Tx & ~Ex), which is entirely possible,
since for some x, it is possible that (Ex -> Tx) be true and Ex be
false while Tx be true.  Further, the unicorn example is still a
term which is characterized by perceptual properties, and so for that
term (Tx -> Px) is still true.
 
I still think it is impossible to support the position that there is something
which exists for which there are no perceptual properties.  Yet I have
given a support for mine. Now I wonder which one of my premises you would
deny:

1. (Ex -> Tx), that is, for us to say that something exists, we must
                have a term for it. ***
2. (Tx -> Px), that is, our terms are based on the clustering of properties.

*** NOTE: The line of argument that something can exist without us saying
          or being able to say that it exists is absurd, because the term
          "existence" is a human linguistic construct, that is, it itself
          is a term which catagorizes.  That is like saying that there
          are things which are red which will under no conditions appear
          red to us -- it is ridiculus because we, as the originators of
          the language, specify the conditions of applicability of the term.
          Thus, if we are not aware of something, we can not apply any term
          to it defining it as an "object," as distinguished from anything
          else.

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu
 

