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From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and consciousness
Message-ID: <jqbD0D3AC.HLp@netcom.com>
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References: <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <D01oB1.JG8@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <D03qpH.7C9@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <D077qE.BJx@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 1994 23:44:35 GMT
Lines: 145

In article <D077qE.BJx@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>If you stick to your position about "gold", then you must be referring to 
>>some "ideal" of gold which has properties about we even now do not know.
>
>Not so.  I am referring to the stuff we call gold, which may well
>have some properties we have not yet discovered.  Strange, isn't
>it, that our definitions might not already tell us everything?  :->

What is "the stuff we call gold", if not some ideal of gold?"  We call "gold"
stuff that has atomic number 79.  Whether or not something is gold depends
not on whether it is "the stuff we call gold", since that is completely
circular, but on whether it has atomic number 79.  Note that "Whether or not
something is gold" means "whether or not the meaning of the word `gold'
includes the stuff under consideration". "gold" is not a certain sort of stuff,
it is a word.

Your notion of "the stuff we call gold" apparently makes sense to you,
but it makes no sense to me, and it apparently makes no sense to Andrzej, Mark,
and many others.  Unless or until you can figure out how to communicate it
in a way that does make sense to us, I don't see how this discussion can go
anywhere.

>
>>BTW, which isotope of gold are you referring to?
>
>It was my assumption that the English word "gold" referred to all
>of them.  If that's not the case, I'll be glad to stand corrected.

The English word "gold" refers to anything with atomic weight 79.  That should
be enough to answer the question.

>>>Nonehteless, Napoleon did either eat an egg or not for breakfast
>>>that day (counting not hvaing breakfast on the didn't eat an egg
>>>for breakfast side).  That's all I mean by saying there's a fact.
>>>If Wittgenstein's an anti-realist about the past, then I'd say
>>>he's wrong.
>>>
>>The point is that there is no way to know it, i.e. it does not make any 
>>difference. 
>
>I picked that example as something we couldn't know (at least not
>in practice, with in-principle perhaps still to be discussed), so
>I'm not going to argue that there is a way to know.

You are begging the question.  You have already asserted that Napoleon either
did or did not eat an egg for breakfast.  On what grounds do you make the
assertion?  Perhaps neither you nor Wittgenstein are wrong.  Perhaps there are
two (or more) models of the world, either of which account for our observations
of it, one saying that there is a matter of fact and one saying that there
isn't.  This seems to have been the dispute between Bohr and Einstein on the
balcony in re the moon.  Some would even argue that the realist model is not
an accurate model of a quantum universe, in which Napoleon-ate-an-egg and
Napoleon-ate-no-egg are in superposition until a distinguishing measurement
is taken.

>>Discussing it makes as much sense as counting angels on a pin head.
>
>I certainly don't see the point in arguing about it.  Indeed,
>who cares what Napoleon ate on most days?  But breakfast foods
>are nice, ordinary, objects in the world.  Angels are a rather
>different case.

The point is that you made an assertion that you cannot verify.  The discussion
(i.e., the assertion that thre is a matter of fact) seems pointless if no
argument can be presented to support it.

>>Classifying it as "a matter of fact" is misuse of the term, since it puts it
>>on par with real "matters of fact", about which we can have evidence.
>
>But nothing in realism stops you from distinguishing cases where we
>can tell from those where we can't.

So how can we tell?  Or are you saying that this distinction does not
distinguish the real from the non-real?  In that case, what *does* distinguish?

>>It obscures the fact that our knowledge of the world comes from interacting
>>with it and ultimately only this interaction counts.
>
>And I'd say your approach obscures various facts.

Such a tease.  Which facts?

>>Well it loos then that I am espousing verificationism. What in your opinion
>>gives meaning to statements, which cannot be verified?
>
>In part, the meanings of the words involved.  "Napoleon ate an egg
>that day" is meaningful.  But if you say otherwise, then fine, we're
>just going to disagree and there may be no point in further discussion.

It could be meaningful without being a fact (the contrary *is* verificationism).

>>>>Because it is more 'economical' - it does not require claiming existance of
>>>>things which are not necessary.
>>>
>>>Why is it more economical?  I'm not sure what you're getting at
>>>here.
>>>
>>'Economica' meaning it uses only minimum of resources. If you have two points
>>to show you a trend, lacking any other evidence you would run a straight line
>>though them, since only two parameters can be uniquely determined with two
>>points, right? Even though you could run an infinity of other lines, with all
>>sorts of parameters, values of which you would have to take out of thin air,
>>or use your emotional preferences (biases).
>
>And so...?  How does this tell agains realism about Napoleon's egg?
>
>>>I mean that in some cases where Occam's razor would pick A over B
>>>we nonetheless pick B and regard that as correct.
>>>
>>Occam's razer is a criterion of last resort, I've though it was clear to
>>everyone. We use it to make a choice, when no other criteria are available. 
>
>The actual use often seems to be as a stick to beat people who don't
>follow a sufficiently "scientific" (often verificationish) line, which
>may make a number of things not always clear to everyone, I fear.

You toss around these innuendoes and then complain about a hostile group.
Interesting.  Poor Jeff just can't get his point across cuz that nasty
William of Ockham was in the weaponry business, sort of how Hume was a hun
per Ayn Rand, I suppose.

Science is based upon verification.  Just what do you mean by "verificationish"?
If you mean the logical positivist verifiability principle, that is about what
has *meaning*, not about what is objective or a matter of fact.  If you mean
refusing to accept as true assertions that cannot be verified, either
empirically or deductively, that just strikes me as being wise and humble.
You will hardly make any headway accusing people of having those characteristics
they value.

>>Please give an example when we choose a more complicated explanation,
>>over a simpler one, with no evidence favouring the complicated one.
>
>I gave an example: physical objects.  You can criticize that example
>if you want.
>
>>Well, some poeple do it on idelogical grounds, but this is not science.
>
>That "not science" is inferior is also ideological.  

That a methodology that allows convergence of opinion about matters of fact
is superior to those that do not might seem like ideology to one who does not
value such convergence, I suppose.
-- 
<J Q B>
