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From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Penrose and Searle (was Re: Roger Penrose's fixed ideas)
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Date: Fri, 25 Nov 1994 20:03:04 GMT
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In article <CzsHMy.B9n@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>In article <CzqHIB.1nA@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
>Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>In article <CzH78F.4Eq@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>............
>>>As someone who defended the TT in this forum, let me once again stress
>>>the rationale of this defence: better bird in hand than two in the bush.
>>>If critics of TT proposed any alternative, there would be something to 
>>>discuss. As it is, saying "there is _more_ to thinking/intelligence than
>>>passing the TT" is meaningless if you can't say what this _more_ is. 
>>>Whatever flaws we in the TT we can point out, it is the best we have.
>>
>>It's a rather small bird, given that we don't know how to construct
>>artificial TT-passers.
>>
>It may be a small bird but those "two birds in the bush" are only suggested
>by some people without any evidence. So, there may be no birds in the bush at
>all and the choice is between a small bird in hand and two speculated birds
>in the bush.

I'm not so sure the TT is all that's available.  We at least
have access to more information that is revealed by the ordinary,
teletype TT.  So why is one particular kind of evidence picked
out as the bird in the hand?  (Which version of the TT do you
say is the bird, BTW, or is it such tests in general?)

>More specifically, although we do not know how to construct an artificial 
>TT-passer, there is a broad consensus (on the basis of progress made so far)
>that such passer may be constructed using extensions of existing technology.
>Do you agree that it looks likely?

It's difficult to say.  It's likely that computers will continue
to become more powerful so that more can be accomplished with 
existing ideas of how to program them.  With enought of that we
may get diffferences that seem qualitative.  But there's still some
dispute about GOFAI vs connectionusm, etc, and there are a number
of different techniques in use.  I think it's to early to be
very sure about what TT-passing programs/machines will be like.
How much, if anything, will be done by genetic algorithms, for
instance.

I also think we should continue to look for new approaches to
hardwafe and software.  I'd be surprised if there were none to
be found.

>>Now, what is the argument for the TT?  That if we can't show it's
>>wrong, we should treat it as right?  Why not say we don't yet know
>>one way or the other?  After all, it's not like we're going have
>>to TT-passers ready tomorrow.  Why the rush?  Why does it *matter*
>>that we have this bird in the hand right now?
>>
>Certainly tomorrow we will not travel to a black hole to get a first hand
>evidence of its existence and properties. Why to rush and speculate
>about them?

Speculation about back holes and Turing Tests is fine with me.
Indeed, I'd like to see more discussion of (particulars of) the TT
rather than less.

>Argument about TT is meant to focus attention on the fact that (or whether)
>the only criterion of intelligence (artificial or otherwise) is a sum of
>responses of a system to external inputs (i.e. its behavior). Naturally 'sum'
>is not meant to be literal sum.

But that still leaves a lot of room for variation (in what behavior
we select as significant).

>>My position is not that there *is* more to thinking, intelligence,
>>or whatever, BTW.  OTOH, it seems plausible to me that some aspects
>>of mental life (or indeed whether there is any mental life) might
>>depend on how the TT-passing behavior is accomplished.
>>
>Please specify what you mean by "mental life". Certainly internal states and
>processes of the system have to have a specific (in some range) structure for
>the system to be able to pass TT. Do you mean something else by "mental life"?

I mean such things as whether something is conscious, whether it
has an internal dialogue (e.g. like when I think to myself "what
should I say next?"), and what emotions it has (or can have).

Here's another example.  In the 1st Terminator film, the terminator
sometimes gets an internal visual display of options for what to say.
Now, most of us at least aren't wired up so that that kind of thing
goes through our visual system in that way.  So this is a difference
between our mental life and his.  Moreover, it's likely that the
difference is because of some hardware/software differences betweem
us and terminators; and it may be that some differences of that sort 
(I don't say between us and terminators specifically) cannot be detected
by certain behavioral tests.  (Maybe, for instance, the teletype TT 
isn't enough.)

>>What in the TT shows anything that passes it *must* have subjective
>>experience, qualia, an internal dialogue, or other such aspects of
>>human mental life?  Is this question out of bounds for some reason?
>>
>Do you mean that you would accept a Harnad's TTT-passer as conscious?

I might, but that isn't what I _meant_ by what's quoted just above.

If I were faced with some TTT- (or even TT-) passing entity, I'd
look to see what birds were to hand, sure.  Indeed, this kind of
issue comes up right now, in a somewhat different form, when it
comes to animal consciousness.  However, if we have an explanation
that does not involve consciousness, it may make sense to prefer
it.  Part of the debate about animal consciousness takes that form.
(See, for instance, Kennedy, _The New Anthropomorphism_.)

What I had in mind in the passage quoted just above was whether
we could not consider what various features of a given test detect.
Or, to put it another way, what kinds of test are required if
they're to reliably detect particular aspects of mental life?
If the teletype TT can determine whether something is conscious
or not, what is it about the teletype TT that does the trick?

So: what are the aspects of the TT that make it be such that
anything that passes it *must* have subjective experience, qualia,
etc?  (If that's what we think passing it shows.)

>If this is not what you mean, then please say what more does _your_ behavior
>show, which would prove that _you_ *must* have all of the above. Your question
>is not out of bounds, it is just empty of content. How do you propose to
>determine if Koko the gorilla (or a chimp) is conscious, other than checking
>if it passes TTT? 

That will depend on what I know about consciousness, the workings
of the brain, gorillas, and on what I know about Turing-style tests.
I'd like to know more about those tests, along the lines suggested
above.  If I have to make the decision right now, of course, then
I'm stuck with what I already know.  What I know now suggests it's
not necessary for a gorilla to pass something as tough as the TTT.

>It seems to me that we do not disagree about the facts: present state of 
>knowledge does not indicate a possibility of criteria for consciousnes other
>then (T)TT. 

If I recall correctly, the TTT is still confined to externally visible
behavior.  That is, it doesn't include anything about internal workings.
It seems to me that at poresent we on our strongest ground when dealing
with entities that are most similar to us: animals, especially
mammals, and better yet primates.  This is a different approach
than the TTT, since the TTT is more in the line of testing abstract
capabilities.

Animals don't (so far) pass the TT or the TTT, but I think that *at
present* at least physical similarity (to humans) gives us stronger
grounds than if we stick to externally visible behavior.  This is not
to say that TTT-passing is not enough; but it does suggest that it may
be worth looking at other things as well.  Perhaps, in the end, such
tests will be no better than the TTT.  Perhaps all other (ie, non-TTT)
factors will turn out to be irrelevant.  OTOH, we may decide the TTT
can be passed w/o being conscious (or w/o having some other property
we're trying to detect).

The terminator example also suggests that we may want to condider some
aspects of internal workings when it comes to certain aspects of
mental life.  Just which aspects of internal workings and which
aspects of mental life are among the things I think should not be
out of bounds.

In general, I don't think criteria that consider more than externally
visible behavior should be ruled out.  When it comes to computers,
we might look at program listings, for instance.

>However, our ways part immediately after this: I think that it
>may be possible that this is due to a nature of the phenomenon (consciousness)
>and consequently no other criterion will be found. You, OTOH, are not yet
>prepared to throw the towel in. Is the a roughly accurate assesment of our
>disagreement?

Roughly, yes.

-- jeff


