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From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Is Common Sense Explicit or Implicit?
Message-ID: <1994Sep19.231500.13069@news.media.mit.edu>
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Cc: minsky
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
References: <pautler-180994142416@pautler.ils.nwu.edu> <pautler-180994150324@pautler.ils.nwu.edu> <35iu52$33o@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 1994 23:15:00 GMT
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In article <35iu52$33o@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In <pautler-180994150324@pautler.ils.nwu.edu> pautler@ils.nwu.edu (David Pautler) writes:
>(relating to the frame problem)
>>> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) wrote:
>>> 
>>> > As my example illustrates, humans seem to have not solved the frame
>>> > problem.  I understand that people will sometimes call their dentist
>>> > twice to cancel the same appointment.  I sometimes leave home, and
>>> > cannot remember if I closed the garage door.  It is my suspicion that
>>> > the frame problem cannot be solved in any practical way, due to its
>>> > computational complexity.  Nevertheless, normal human behavior does
>>> > not seem to be significantly impacted by an inability to solve the
>>> > frame problem.  This is one of the reasons that I doubt that beliefs
>>> > will have a significant role in explaining human behavior.
>
>>Let me add:
>
>>Assuming that beliefs are important to the frame problem, but the
>>frame problem isn't an important part of human behavior, what
>>about other common uses of belief?  What about the example of
>>formulating a belief of where the nearest gas station is, so we
>>can fill up?
>
>An interesting case.  When I drive to an unfamiliar town, and stop
>for the night or for a meal, I do depend on beliefs for finding the
>nearest gas station.  And I have to be careful about not driving too
>randomly around the town, lest my difficulty with the frame problem
>cause me to lose my way.  But when I am driving around my home town,
>I do not need the beliefs.  I have some other form of knowledge about
>the town.  You can call it acquaintance knowledge, or knowing how to
>find my way around the town.  Whatever you call it, it does not seem
>to be in the form of beliefs, and I can use that knowledge without
>reliance on solutions of the frame problem.

Well, maybe the idea of 'belief' is a bit strong.  I'm sure you're
familiar with the idea of frames with default assignments.  When a
frame perfectly fits a situation, then you act as though you 'know' or
'are sure' or whatever you want to call it.  When some details are not
available, then you use  stored 'default' values.  I designed this, in
the first place, to take care of frame-assumptions because we hardly
ever know everything about any situation.

Now, if we consider slot-attachments of various kinds and strengths,
then we get various forms of reasoning and acting.  If an attachment
is unusually firm, then we might hear statements like "I know that my
redeemer liveth."  Of course, in most such cases, the 'believer' is
quaking in its boots, but its Freudian censors are opposing every
overt appearance of doubt that might make the believer think to
himself that this is not knowledge but mere belief.

