From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!tamsun.tamu.edu!mtecv2!academ01!iordonez Wed Sep 23 16:54:13 EDT 1992
Article 6958 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: iordonez@academ01.mty.itesm.mx (Ivan Ordonez-Reinoso)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: what is consciousness for?
Message-ID: <iordonez.716751021@academ01>
Date: 17 Sep 92 17:30:21 GMT
References: <1992Aug13.025506.2404@news.media.mit.edu> <1992Aug17.171723.5599@spss.com> <iordonez.715366473@academ01> <1992Sep1.183909.4018@spss.com>
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markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:

>In article <iordonez.715366473@academ01> iordonez@academ01.mty.itesm.mx (Ivan Ordonez-Reinoso) writes:
>>I find very hard to argue about the use of consciousness when we don't
>>have the least idea of what it is. Defining consciousness as 'self
>>awareness' is a somewhat circular definition, and it would indeed,
>>as M. Minsky points, imply that we human have very little conciousness,
>>and that computers (which can have a full internal description of their
>>own function) might be more conscious than we are.

>I find this last point rather opaque.  In what sense do computers have
>a "full internal description of their own function"?

A computer _may_ have a internal description of its own function in the
sense that it can simulate itself. Think of operating systems like VM.

[...]

>it's only a convenient fiction to speak of a program, or a module, or 
>a line of code, knowing or doing anything.  The CPU by its nature is not
>aware of anything more than the instruction and operand in front of its nose.

I completely agree with this point. The code in a program has no
semantic meaning to the hardware, since the hardware is unable to
understand anything (it only _DOES_ things). But Minsky seems to relate
consciousness with knowing, and knowing with 'knowledge' in the sense of
containing information. From a purely functional point of view, a
computer that simulates itself 'knows' itself and is self-aware. In this
sense it seems obvious to me that self awareness is not a sufficient
condition to consciousness.

>>I don't think consciousness can be defined in terms of observing,
>>noticing, knowing. Minsky's definition is, in my opinion, specifically
>>cooked to make appear that machines are better than us in this regard.
>>This is like a painter who uses a lot of green in his pictures defining
>>beauty as the amount of green a picture has!

>And the fact that we would reject the painter's definition shows that we
>do have a notion of beauty that goes beyond mere greenness.  If it were 
>true that we "don't have the least idea" what consciousness is, as you 
>assert above, then there would be no way to criticize Minsky's definition 
>(or anyone else's).

I think we have a notion of beauty, but I couldn't say what it is. I
would even dare to say nobody has the least idea of what beauty is,
since nobody has ever formalized the concept yet. Or do you have a
computer program that can read any input (a symphony, the picture of a
flower, a book from Kafka, a theorem, a sunset) and find its degree of
beauty? However, we can, at least, recognize what is _not beauty_. I am
almost certain that the amount of green in a picture is not beauty. And
I am almost certain that having an internal description of one own's
function is not consciousness.

>What do you feel is left out by defining consciousness in terms of 
>observing or knowing?

Define 'being'. I think consciousness relates more with being than with
doing things.

>One need not be a materialist to assume that consciousness has a purpose.
>In most theistic systems, our consciousness presumably serves some purpose
>of the gods.  In what systems does consciousness serve no purpose at all?

Theism is not the only alternative to materialism. My claim is that it
is erroneous to speak about consciousness as if it were just another
organ in our bodies, or another function of an organ, like 'vision' or
hearing. I am sorry to repeat myself, but I must say again that while
all those functions (like vision) relate with doing things,
consciousness relates with being. Of course this is philosophical and
metaphysical, but this is a philosophy newsgroup, after all.

--Ivan Ordonez-Reinoso
iordonez@omega.mty.itesm.mx


