From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!olivea!spool.mu.edu!agate!agate!usenet Wed Sep 16 21:23:12 EDT 1992
Article 6895 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: william@moica.berkeley.edu (William E. Grosso)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re:
Message-ID: <18tpp9INNjtb@agate.berkeley.edu>
Date: 12 Sep 92 22:08:41 GMT
References: <1992Sep11.154029.14574@oracorp.com>
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
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Daryl McCullough writes
> mark_turnbull.g033@qmgate.mitre.org (Mark Turnbull) writes:
> >Well, that's all there would be to it if, whenever I embarked on a 
> >lifetime pen-pal relationship, I could make no reasonable assumptions 
> >about the nature of the pen-pal.  I wouldn't arbitrarily deny a  
pen-pal 
> >its mind just because I knew it to be a machine of a different type  
than I 
> >am, nor would I expect its performance to be better in any respect  
than 
> >that of the human I assume has a mind, but isn't there a lot left out  
if one 
> >takes the responses, verbal and otherwise, of a device, to be the only 
> >relevant (and indeed, sufficient) information to be used in judging  
the 
> >presence of a mind?  I'm not willing to jettison all the other things  
I 
> >believe about my currently likely pen-pals and state that biological  
facts 
> >play no part in my assessment of the chances that my correspondent has  
a 
> >mind.  


> I find it strange to you assert that your assumptions about the
> *biology* of your pen-pals plays any kind of role in knowing whether
> they have minds. What aspects of biology are relevant? What
> assumptions about my biology are needed for you to conclude that I
> have a mind?
> 

I think the point my be that "biology" is a very strong piece
of corroborating evidence that could sway the decision towards 
the conclusion "my pen-pal is intelligent". Because, if an
entity which is quite similar to me is writing me letters, I
am predisposed to say that it is producing the letters in much
the same way I would. E.g. by thinking.

Whereas I might not have a similar insight into how a dis-similar
entity produces its letters and therefore might not be so hasty
in crediting said entity with intelligence.

Having said the above, let me say that I think it is flawed.
It gives me another method to detect intelligence (e.g 
through the argument "I am intelligent. That being is functionally
equivalent to me. therefore that being is intelligent"). It does
bot invalidate TT.

Bill Grosso


